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INTRODUCTION
Alternative energy supplies get most of the attention in the
climate change debate, but reducing energy demand should be the
dominant strategy for cutting global greenhouse gas emissions.
Dozens of technical studies have concluded that improving the
efficiency of automobiles, furnaces, motors, consumer electronics,
lighting, air conditioners, and other energy-using products is the
cheapest and fastest way to achieve dramatic reductions in
greenhouse gas emissions.' In fact, avoiding catastrophic global
heating largely depends on how fast energy efficient technology can be
deployed over the next few decades. 2
Energy efficiency can be promoted through multiple policies,
such as energy taxes, a cap-and-trade system, tax credits for efficient
appliances, product labeling, increased government research and
1. See, e.g., AMERICA'S ENERGY FUTURE PANEL ON ENERGY EFFICIENCY TECHS., NATL
ACAD. OF ScIs., REAL PROSPECTS FOR ENERGY EFFICIENCY IN THE UNITED STATES 41-56 (2010)
[hereinafter REAL PROSPECTS REPORT] (analyzing the potential for improvements in energy
efficiency in lighting, air conditioning, and other appliances in residential and commercial
buildings); AMORY B. LOVINS, ROCKY MOUNTAIN INST., REINVENTING FIRE: BOLD BUSINESS
SOLUTIONS FOR THE NEW ENERGY ERA 11-12 (2011) (outlining steps to reduce energy use,
modulate demand, and optimize supply in the areas of transportation, buildings, industry, and
electricity generation); AM. PHYSICAL SOC'Y, ENERGY=FUTURE: THINK EFFICIENCY 9-14 (2008),
available at http://www.aps.org/energyefficiencyreport/report/aps-energyreport.pdf (outlining
potential efficiency improvements for transportation, buildings, and industry); FLORIAN
BRESSAND ET AL., MCKINSEY GLOBAL INST., CURBING GLOBAL ENERGY DEMAND GROWTH: THE
ENERGY PRODUCTIVITY OPPORTUNITY 17-22 (2007), available at http://www.mckinsey.com
/Insights/MGI/Research/NaturalResources/Curbing-global-energy-demand.growth (outlining
cost-effective methods for improving energy productivity); FLORIAN BRESSAND ET AL., MCKINSEY
GLOBAL INST., WASTED ENERGY: HOW THE US CAN REACH ITS ENERGY PRODUCTIVITY POTENTIAL
5-15 (2007), available at http://www.mckinsey.com/insights/mgi/research/natural-resources/
how us can reach its energypotential (detailing wasteful energy use in the United States and
noting that U.S. energy use per unit of GDP is among the highest in the developed world).
2. According to the 2007 Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change, the cost of stabilizing greenhouse gas concentrations at 550 ppm by 2050
ranges from 4% of global GDP (about 0.1% of global GDP per year) to a slight increase in GDP.
See IPCC Fourth Assessment Report: Climate Change 2007, INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON
CLIMATE CHANGE, http://www.ipcc.ch/publications and data/ar4lwg3/enltss3-2-stabilization-
scenarios.html (last visited Sept. 22, 2012) (detailing the relationship between the cost of
mitigation and long-term stabilization targets in Figure TS.9). This difference in cost projections
depends on assumptions made about the rate of technological change and the rate of deployment
of low-carbon technology. See id. at fig.TS.10 (estimating cumulative emission reductions for
alternative mitigation measures).
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development ("R&D"), or direct regulatory limits on the energy
consumption of products.
Of these policies, the regulatory option seems most intrusive,
as it limits consumer choice and requires complex governmental
mandates that affect product design. While the other policies nudge
consumers in the direction of efficiency, regulation commands energy
efficient choices by forcing inefficient products off the market.
In this Article, I demonstrate that the regulatory strategy for
energy efficiency is working. Although information disclosure,
financial incentives, and other softer alternatives to regulation play a
vital role in reducing energy demand, these should be viewed as
complements to efficiency regulation, rather than replacements. The
regulatory approach has led to substantial cost and energy savings in
the past, it has enjoyed bipartisan political support, and it targets
products and behaviors that are difficult to address through other
policy tools. Given the politics of climate change in the United States,
which make federal carbon taxes or a cap-and-trade system infeasible,
the regulatory option should be expanded, not abandoned.
The regulatory strategy I focus on in this Article is minimum
energy performance standards ("MEPS") for products3-efficiency
benchmarks that manufacturers must meet to sell products in a
jurisdiction. I do not discuss automobile fuel efficiency standards in
this Article, as that topic has been amply covered elsewhere.4 Most
Americans are familiar with MEPS for products other than
automobiles because of refrigerator and air conditioner efficiency
standards enacted in the 1980s.
In recent years, governments have dramatically expanded their
reliance on MEPS. Beyond refrigeration and air conditioning,
governments are now implementing MEPS for dozens of product
3. The International Energy Agency defines MEPS as "legally enforced thresholds for an
individual product or group of products, set at a level to exclude a proportion of the worst
performing products in the marketplace." MARK ELLIS, INT'L ENERGY AGENCY, EXPERIENCE WITH
ENERGY EFFICIENCY REGULATIONS FOR ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT 18 (2007), available at
http://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/pubhication/Appliances-Ellis.pdf.
4. See, e.g., COMM. ON THE EFFECTIVENESS & IMPACT OF CORPORATE AVERAGE FUEL
ECONOMY (CAFE) STANDARDS ET AL., NATL ACAD. OF ScIS., EFFECTIVENESS AND IMPACT OF
CORPORATE AVERAGE FUEL ECONOMY (CAFE) STANDARDS 64-67 (2002) (analyzing
environmental and financial impacts of various fuel economy standards); CONG. BUDGET OFFICE,
THE ECONOMIC COSTS OF FUEL ECONOMY STANDARDS VERSUS A GASOLINE TAX 16-17 (2003),
available at http:(/www.cbo.govlsites/default/filescbofilesftpdcs/49xx/doc4917/12-24-03-cafe.pdf
(analyzing the effect of raising CAFE standards on gasoline consumption); Jody Freeman, The
Obama Administration's National Auto Policy: Lessons from the "Car Deal," 35 HARV. ENVTL. L.
REV. 343, 367-68 (2011) (discussing Obama Administration initiatives to increase fuel efficiency
and reduce automobile greenhouse gas emissions).
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categories, including residential and commercial appliances, consumer
electronics, lighting, motors, and other energy-using equipment-all of
which have become major contributors to global greenhouse gas
emissions. As a result, households are being enlisted as participants in
national climate policy.
The international surge in product regulation is a response to
rising energy consumption in consumer products and commercial
equipment. Consider, for example, residential electrical equipment
such as home computers, lighting, and refrigerators. That equipment
is responsible for 30% of all electricity consumed in OECD countries
and accounts for 21% of all energy-related C02 emissions. 5 Moreover,
the global growth in energy use between now and 2030 just for
information and communication technology and consumer electronics
will exceed the entire current electricity consumption of the United
States and Japan combined. 6 Energy use is rising globally because
affluent households have become voracious consumers of electronic
gadgets and conveniences, and the developing world is adopting air
conditioning, refrigeration, and information technology at an
unprecedented rate.
Given this growth, there is enormous potential for MEPS as a
core climate change strategy. By improving the efficiency of energy-
using products, governments can avoid construction of hundreds of
electricity-generating plants that might otherwise be needed to power
all of this equipment.7 On a global basis, improving the efficiency of
energy-using products in the residential sector alone could abate
sixteen quadrillion BTUs of 2020 energy demand-equal to the energy
provided by 610 power plants. 8 In planning a climate change
mitigation strategy, we cannot ignore this enormous potential for
energy savings. 9 If we are going to enjoy the fruits of a global economy
5. ELLIS, supra note 3, at 23.
6. MARK ELLIS, INT'L ENERGY AGENCY, GADGETS AND GIGAWATTS: POLICIES FOR ENERGY
EFFICIENT ELECTRONICS 21 (2009), available at http://www.iea.org/speec12009/Waide-
GadgetsGigawatts.pdf
7. See, e.g., id. (reporting that 280 GW of new electricity-generating capacity will be
needed just to service all the new IT equipment and consumer electronics that will be added to
the market between now and 2030).
8. DIANA FARRELL ET AL., MCKINSEY GLOBAL INST., THE CASE FOR INVESTING IN ENERGY
PRODUCTIVITY 24 (2008), available at http://www.mckinsey.com/Insights/MGI/Research/Natural-
Resources/The-case for investing-ia-energy-productivity.
9. See REAL PROSPECTS REPORT, supra note 1, at 1 ("Price fluctuations, national security
concerns over U.S. dependence on imported oil, and growing recognition of the need to reduce
emissions of greenhouse gases have transformed energy efficiency from an option to a
necessity.").
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in 2050 that is predicted to be four times as large as today, 10 while
reducing greenhouse gas emissions 50% to 85% below today's levels,"
we will need to get substantially more useful work out of every unit of
energy consumed.
This Article, one of the first analyses of MEPS in legal
scholarship,12 discusses the realistic potential for product standards as
a climate change strategy. It proceeds in three parts.
In Part I, I introduce the goals and structure of MEPS and then
sketch their prior implementation in the United States and the
European Union ("EU'). Both the United States and the EU have
massively expanded their regulation of product efficiency in the past
five years, and efficiency standards are one of the principal
environmental legacies of President Obama's first term. The EU has,
in addition, deployed other strategies to decrease energy consumption,
including high gasoline taxes and its Emissions Trading System. The
United States is highly unlikely to enact national emissions trading or
carbon taxes any time soon. I argue, therefore, that in the near term
direct regulation of the energy use of products is one of the few
politically acceptable tools in the U.S. climate toolbox.
In Part II, I provide a theoretical justification for efficiency
standards. I argue that standards are an appropriate response to
energy market failures and to the environmental externalities
inherent in energy consumption. While alternative approaches to
10. See URI DADUSH & BENNETT STANCIL, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INT'L PEACE, THE
WORLD ORDER IN 2050, at 8 (2010), available at http://www.carnegieendowment.org
files/WorldOrder in_2050.pdf (noting that the total output of the G20 major economies is
expected to grow, in real dollars, from $38.3 trillion in 2009 to $160.0 trillion in 2050).
11. INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: SYNTHESIS
REPORT 67 (2007), available at http://www.ipcc.ch/publications-and-data/publications
_ipccjfourth assessment.report-synthesisjreport.htm (projecting that a reduction from year
2000 emissions of 50-85% by 2050 would keep the global average surface temperature increase
to around two degrees Celsius, using "best estimate" climate sensitivity).
12. Economists and political scientists have dominated the academic scholarship on the
links between regulation and technological change. See, e.g., Thomas Bernauer et al., Explaining
Green Innovation 2 (Ctr. for Intl & Comparative Studies, Working Paper No. 17, 2006), available
at http://www.cis.ethz.ch/publications/WP-17_GreenInn.pdf. Professor John Dernbach at
Widener Law School is one of the few legal scholars to examine MEPS in some detail. See JOHN
C. DERNBACH, ACTING AS IF TOMORROW MATTERS: ACCELERATING THE TRANSITION TO
SUSTAINABILITY 69 (2012) (arguing that environmental sustainability is consistent with economic
and technological growth); John C. Dernbach & Marianne Tyrell, Federal Energy Efficiency and
Conservation Laws, in THE LAW OF CLEAN ENERGY: EFFICIENCY AND RENEWABLES 25, 26
(Michael Gerrard ed., 2011) (overview of U.S. law and policy governing energy efficiency and
conservation); John C. Dernbach, Stabilizing and Then Reducing U.S. Energy Consumption:




climate change mitigation, such as carbon pricing or energy taxes, also
address externalities, they are not likely to drive significant changes
in energy usage or equipment purchasing decisions. Although these
policies will increase energy prices slightly, consumers will either not
notice the price increase or will not care enough to change their
purchasing decisions and energy-consumption habits. After discussing
these hurdles to behavioral and technological change, I then turn to a
regulatory strategy. I address some of the traditional criticisms of
command-and-control regulation and show why MEPS offer a sound
energy efficiency strategy that is consistent with continued product
innovation.
Finally, in Part III, I explore the promise and perils of
expanding product regulation in the coming years. I outline the
potential energy savings that can be expected from feasible product
standards, as well as some of the limitations of a regulatory strategy. I
also discuss the long-term political viability of MEPS, focusing on the
2011 congressional skirmish over light bulb efficiency standards,
which was the first major political backlash in the United States
against MEPS. The debate over the light bulb standards pitted energy
efficiency against consumer choice, and this values clash, if it
continues, could threaten support for efficiency regulation.
I. A REGULATORY STRATEGY FOR THE CLIMATE
Government regulation of the energy efficiency of products
dates to the 1970s energy crisis. Initially enacted for major household
appliances such as refrigerators and air conditioners, MEPS are now
applied widely-in the United States, Europe, China, Japan,
Australia, and other jurisdictions13-to products such as heating and
cooling equipment, lighting, televisions, motors, washers, and fans.
MEPS operate by specifying the minimum energy efficiency
requirements (or maximum energy usage) for a given product category
and forbidding manufacturers from selling products that fall below the
standards. In 2009, for example, California enacted a first-in-the-
nation set of MEPS for televisions, requiring that televisions sold in
California use 49% less energy in 2013 compared to 2009.14 This
13. ELLIS, supra note 3, at 29-31.
14. See CAL. CODE REGS., tit. 20, § 1601 et seq. (2009); News Release, Cal. Energy Comm'n,
California Approves New Energy Efficient TV Regulations (Nov. 18, 2009), available at
http://www.energy.ca.gov/releases/2009_releases/2009-11-18_tv regulations.html (discussing the
passage and potential results of the California television regulation).
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television regulation, like most MEPS, achieves energy savings by
knocking the worst-performing products off the market.
MEPS are in a small class of environmental regulations that
target household and business purchasing decisions and energy
consumption, rather than harmful emissions from industrial
facilities.15 They affect common products used in millions of homes,
and they touch nearly every corner of the consumer lifestyle. MEPS
directly address the carbon emissions from the use of a product, which
often exceed the carbon emissions from the production of the
product. 16 Like twisting a soaking wet towel, governments are
attempting to wring out the carbon intensity of products. Below, I
outline governmental goals and then discuss the implementation of
MEPS in the United States and the EU.
A. Product Standards-Objectives and Regulatory Design
Governments have three principal goals in enacting MEPS.
The first goal is cost savings. Because MEPS reduce long-term
operating costs of energy-using equipment, they are widely viewed as
a consumer-friendly, cost-effective means of reducing greenhouse gas
emissions. 17 The reduced operational costs more than offset increases
15. Recent environmental scholarship is beginning to address the environmental
consequences of individual and household behavior. See JASON J. CZARNEzKI, EVERYDAY
ENVIRONMENTALISM: LAW, NATURE & INDIVIDUAL BEHAVIOR 11 (2011) (noting that increased
consumption of electronics and appliances has depleted natural resources and increased
pollution); Hope M. Babcock, Assuming Personal Responsibility for Improving the Environment:
Moving Toward a New Environmental Norm, 33 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 117 (2009) (discussing the
aggregate environmental impact of individual activities and barriers to changing individual
behavior); John C. Dernbach, Harnessing Individual Behavior to Address Climate Change:
Options for Congress, 26 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 107, 108 (2008) (analyzing how Congress can engage
individuals in implementing climate change legislation); Andrew Green, Self Control, Individual
Choice, and Climate Change, 26 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 77, 78 (2008) (examining barriers to behavioral
change, even for individuals who value environmental action); Douglas A. Kysar & Michael P.
Vandenbergh, Climate Change and Consumption, 38 ENVTL. L. REP. 10825, 10826 (2008) (noting
focus of 1970s environmental statutes on industrial emissions standards, not consumption);
Michael P. Vandenbergh & Anne C. Steinemann, The Carbon Neutral Individual, 82 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1673, 1676 (2007) (noting overwhelming focus of federal and state regulators on large
industrial sources of emissions and exploring prospects for reducing carbon emissions from
individuals and households), This scholarship is helpful both in spotlighting the environmental
impact of individual behavior and in proposing policy solutions to lessen this impact, challenging
conventional wisdom that consumer desire and individual consumption are beyond the realm of
policy intervention.
16. Kysar & Vandenbergh, supra note 15, at 10828.
17. See, e.g., REAL PROSPECTS REPORT; supra note 1, at 8 (estimating that it costs 2.7
cents/kwh to conserve electricity, whereas the retail price of residential electricity is 10.6
cents/kwh).
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in the initial purchase price of more efficient equipment. Numerous
studies have found substantial net benefits from the programs, with
relatively quick "payback periods" (in which consumers can recoup
higher upfront costs within one to three years).' 8 Improving energy
efficiency does not always result in higher retail prices for products.
For some products-such as refrigerators and furnaces-real retail
prices have declined significantly since the 1970s at the same time
that manufacturers have achieved dramatic improvements in energy
efficiency.19
With the prospect of emissions reductions and cost savings, it
is now widely recognized to the point of clich6 that efficiency measures
are the low-hanging fruit of climate change mitigation policy.
Secretary of Energy Steven Chu extended this metaphor: "[E]nergy
efficiency is not just low-hanging fruit; it is fruit that is lying on the
ground. And energy efficiency means money back in your pocket
because you pay less on your energy bills."2°
The second goal of product efficiency standards is to reduce
energy consumption, with associated reductions in both greenhouse
gas emissions and conventional pollution. The energy savings can be
dramatic. In 2009, for example, the United States saved more energy
from refrigerator efficiency standards alone than it produced from
solar and wind power combined. 21 The American Council for an
Energy Efficient Economy ("ACEEE") has estimated that feasible
efficiency standards could avoid almost 470 million metric tons of C02
emissions annually in the United States by 2035, equivalent to the
annual emissions from 118 coal-fired power plants.22 Looking globally,
18. See, e.g., ELLIS, supra note 3, at 12-15 (setting forth a summary of efficiency and price
trends for equipment and appliances); INT'L ENERGY AGENCY, WORLD ENERGY OUTLOOK 2007:
CHINA AND INDIA INSIGHTS 387 (2007), available at http://www.iea.org/textbase/nppdf
/free/2007/weo_2007.pdf (noting a three-and-a-half year payback period for Chinese efficiency
standards for refrigerators, given then-prevailing electricity prices in China).
19. See ELLIS, supra note 3, at 62 (surveying MEPS in Europe, the United Kingdom, the
United States, and Australia and concluding that the programs resulted in energy efficiency
increases between 10% to 60% in covered products, along with declines in real prices between
10% and 45%).
20. Steven Chu, Cleaning Up: Energy and Climate Bill Will Boost the Economy, RICHMOND
TIMES-DISPATCH, July 22, 2009, http://www2.timesdispatch.com/news/2009/jul/22/ed-
chu22_20090721-173805-ar-36524/.
21. See David Biello, U.S. Unveils a $350-Million Energy-Efficiency Initiative at
Copenhagen, SCI. AM., Dec. 15, 2009, http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=solar-
lanterns-light-chu.
22. AMANDA LOWENBERGER ET AL., AM. COUNCIL FOR AN ENERGY-EFFICIENT ECON., THE
EFFICIENCY BOOM: CASHING IN ON THE SAVINGS FROM APPLIANCE STANDARDS iv (2012), available
at http://www.aceee.org/sites/default/files/publications/researchreports/a23.pdf.
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McKinsey & Co. has estimated that a major governmental push for
energy efficiency could reduce 2020 energy consumption by 9.1
quadrillion BTUs, or roughly 23% of projected global demand,
potentially abating up to 1.1 gigatons of greenhouse gases annually. 23
The third goal of product efficiency standards is to improve
energy planning and free up investor capital that would otherwise
flow to power plant construction and other energy supply projects. 24
The ability to ensure electric grid stability through reduced demand,
rather than increased supply, is a major consideration that supports
expansion of MEPS. Given fierce public opposition to new coal and
nuclear power plants and to new transmission lines,25  the
decentralized approach of demand reduction is an attractive option for
policymakers.
Improving the efficiency of energy end uses is a critical
component of demand reduction. In a stunning finding that was
largely overlooked in the media, the National Academy of Sciences
recently concluded that implementing realistic efficiency measures for
existing and new buildings could obviate the need to build any new
power plants in the United States. 26 Moreover, as energy expert
Amory Lovins has explained, a kilowatt saved "downstream" at the
electrical outlet saves up to ten kilowatts "upstream" at the
generating station, because of unavoidable energy loss in electricity
23. Hannah Choi Granade et al., Energy Efficiency: Unlocking the US Opportunity, in
ENERGY EFFICIENCY: A COMPELLING GLOBAL RESOURCE 4, 4 (McKinsey & Co. ed., 2010),
available at http://www.mckinsey.com/Search.aspx?q=a%20compelling%20global%20resource;
see also REAL PROSPECTS REPORT, supra note 1, at 4 (deploying available technology to improve
efficiency could result in U.S. energy consumption that is 17-20% lower than business-as-usual
projections in 2020 and 25-31% lower in 2030).
24. Product efficiency standards are particularly important for avoiding construction of
expensive "peaking units" that supply power during periods of peak demand. Supplying peak
power is vastly more expensive for utilities than supplying off-peak power, see David. B. Spence,
Can Law Manage Competitive Energy Markets?, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 765, 796-97 (2008), so
improving the efficiency of appliances that tend to run at peak periods (such as air conditioning)
helps to stabilize electricity prices.
25. Stephen Ansolabehere & David M. Konisky, Public Attitudes Toward Construction of
New Power Plants, 73 PUB. OPINION Q. 566 (2009) (finding that a substantial majority of
Americans oppose siting new coal, nuclear, or natural gas generating plants in their area).
26. See REAL PROSPECTS REPORT, supra note 1, at 5 (concluding that feasible efficiency
improvements in the building sector, including efficiency upgrades in electrical equipment,
would mean that the United States would not need new generating capacity, except to address
regional supply imbalances, replace obsolete generation assets, or substitute more
environmentally benign generation sources). While efficiency improvements in the building
sector include items such as better insulation, which are typically not covered by MEPS, most of
the efficiency improvements discussed in the NAS report come from improvements in energy-
using products. Space heating, cooling, and ventilation are the largest consumers of energy in
buildings, followed by lighting. Id. at 6.
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production and transmission.27 Therefore, making products more
efficient provides a crucial leverage point both for reducing power
plant emissions and for avoiding new power plant construction.
In environmental law parlance, MEPS are performance
standards (setting minimum efficiency standards for a product class),
rather than design standards (dictating the particular technology that
must be deployed to reach that objective). 28 This is a critical
distinction. Performance standards allow for design flexibility and
promote manufacturer innovation to meet the target, without locking
in any particular technological approach. As Michael Porter and other
scholars of industrial policy have noted, performance standards focus
on outcomes-rather than particular technologies-and can promote
creative diversity within industry.29
While performance standards promote private-sector flexibility,
substantial government oversight is required to design and implement
them. In the regulatory process for MEPS, a government agency must
gather economic and technical information, consult with stakeholders,
and set the performance standard for each product class. Post-
promulgation, a government agency must monitor compliance and
enforce against violators. MEPS rely on the coercive power of the state
to shape what products can be sold. To borrow a phrase from
Lawrence Lessig, MEPS regulate through "architecture"-they change
the physical "features of the world" within which market actors make
their choices. 30
One important limitation of product standards is that they
cannot guarantee absolute reductions in energy demand. For several
reasons, total national energy consumption may increase even after
MEPS are in place. Consumers, as they become wealthier over time,
27. See AMORY B. LOVINS, ROCKY MOUNTAIN INST., ENERGY END-USE EFFICIENCY 5 (2005),
available at http://www.rmi.org/Knowledge-Center/Library/E05-16-EnergyEndUseEfficiency.
28. See Adam B. Jaffe, Richard G. Newell & Robert N. Stavins, A Tale of Two Market
Failures: Technology and Environmental Policy, 54 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 164, 171 (2004)
(advocating that technology policy should be "technology neutral, encouraging all efforts that
achieve specified objectives without focusing on a particular approach").
29. See, e.g., Michael E. Porter & Claas Van der Linde, Green and Competitive: Ending the
Stalemate, HARv. BUS. REV., Sept.-Oct. 1995, at 120, 124; see also ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL.,
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE, AND POLICY 153 (6th ed. 2009) ("Technological
innovation that expands the menu, increases the capability, or reduces the cost of available
pollution control technology is commonly viewed as a desirable goal."); Cary Coglianese et al.,
Performance-Based Regulation: Prospects and Limitations in Health, Safety, and Environmental
Protection, 55 ADMIN. L. REV. 705, 711 (2003) ("Performance standards can also accommodate
technological change and the emergence of new hazards in ways that prescriptive technology-
based standards generally cannot.").
30. Lawrence Lessig, The New Chicago School, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 661, 663 (1998).
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may simply choose to buy more energy-using products or to operate
them longer (as occurred with air conditioning in the United States).3 1
Population growth may swamp the gains in efficiency from regulation.
And efficiency standards are subject to the so-called "rebound effect,"
in which consumers may use products more intensively as products
become more energy efficient, even holding wealth constant.3 2
Many commentators have pointed to these wealth effects,
population growth effects, and rebound effects as reasons why an
energy efficiency strategy for climate change is futile or even
counterproductive. 33 Media outlets have amplified these arguments,
31. In a widely noted 2010 article in The New Yorker, David Owen alleged that efficiency
regulation was futile, noting that between 1993 and 2005, U.S. air conditioners increased their
efficiency by 28%, yet homes used 37% more energy for air conditioning during this same period.
David Owen, The Efficiency Dilemma, THE NEW YORKER, Dec. 20, 2010, at 80-81. These figures
hardly illustrate that efficiency regulation was ineffective, however. The increase in energy
usage was mainly attributable to a wealth effect in which Americans moved to larger homes and
shifted to central air conditioning rather than room air conditioning. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
MEDIAN AND AVERAGE SQUARE FEET OF FLOOR AREA IN NEW SINGLE-FAMILY HOUSES
COMPLETED BY LOCATION (2010), available at http://www.census.gov/const/ C25Ann
/sftotalmedavgsqft.pdf (median house size increased from 1,945 square feet in 1993 to 2,227
square feet in 2005); FREDERICK J. EGGERS & ALEXANDER THACKERAY, U.S. DEPr OF HOUS. &
URBAN DEV. OFFICE OF POLICY DEV. & RESEARCH, 32 YEARS OF HOUSING DATA 17 fig. 11 (2007),
available at http://www.huduser.org/ datasets/ahs/AHStaskC.pdf (share of all U.S. homes with
central air grew from around 45% in 1995 to 65% in 2005). Owen fallaciously attributed the
rapid rise in energy consumption from air conditioning to a "rebound" from efficiency regulation,
rather than to these exogenous wealth effects, which are beyond the control of environmental
regulators. Given the wealth-driven demand for more air conditioning, MEPS were successful in
that the air conditioners consumers actually purchased were substantially more efficient due to
government policy.
32. GLOBAL VIEW SUSTAINABILITY SERVS. ET AL., EUROPEAN COMM'N, ADDRESSING THE
REBOUND EFFECT 6 (2011), available at http://ec.europa.eulenvironment/eussd/pdf
/rebound.effect.report.pdf.
33. See DAVID OWEN, THE CONUNDRUM: HOW SCIENTIFIC INNOVATION, INCREASED
EFFICIENCY, AND GOOD INTENTIONS CAN MAKE OUR ENERGY AND CLIMATE PROBLEMS WORSE
101-02 (2012) (noting that during the period in which new refrigerators increased in efficiency
and decreased in price, total energy consumption for refrigeration climbed); Lorna A. Greening,
David L. Green & Carmen Difiglio, Energy Efficiency and Consumption - The Rebound Effect - A
Survey, 28 ENERGY POL'Y 389, 389-92 (2000) (positing that improvements in efficiency will
reduce the per-unit price of energy services and cause energy consumption to increase); David A.
Farenthold, Are American Homes More Energy Efficient? Not Exactly., WASH. POST, Sept. 30,
2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/contentlarticle/2010/09/29/AR2010092906585.html
(noting that energy use in the average American home has remained stable since 1970 because
although appliances and heating have become vastly more efficient, home sizes have increased
and Americans use more electronic gadgets); Owen, supra note 31, at 78 (noting that population
increase has caused a rapid increase in appliance purchases); John Tierney, When Energy
Efficiency Sullies the Environment, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 2011, at D1 (arguing that efficiency
measures may be ineffective if the immediate goal is reducing greenhouse gas emissions).
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caricaturing energy efficiency policy as self-defeating.3 4 But empirical
studies have found that the "rebound effect" is modest (anywhere from
10% to 30%, depending on the product or industry).35 In other words,
the rebound effect cuts into, but does not negate, the benefits of
promoting efficiency as climate policy. Moreover, none of these effects
undermine the project of regulating for energy efficiency once it is
acknowledged that the goal of product standards is not to lower global
energy consumption in absolute terms: it is to reduce energy demand
compared to the business-as-usual pathway where energy demand is
rising rapidly. Advocates of MEPS do not suggest that MEPS alone
will lead to a reduction in global energy consumption from today's
levels. They are but one crucial "wedge" in the larger climate puzzle. 36
B. Standards in Practice: The United States and the European Union
The United States and the EU have both embraced product
regulation as a climate change strategy and have substantially
expanded their product standards programs in the past five years. In
this Section, I compare the approaches of these two jurisdictions to
illustrate the regulatory and political challenges of relying on product
standards as climate change policy.
1. Efficiency Regulation in the United States
The U.S. approach to product efficiency regulation has been
characterized by close cooperation with industry stakeholders,
consensus-oriented standards, and incremental improvements (rather
than radical leaps) in product efficiency. Most of the U.S. MEPS-for
products such as refrigerators, heating and cooling equipment, and
lighting-have been established by statute, rather than by delegation
34. See Owen, supra note 31, at 78 (arguing that increased consumption may negate the
effects of energy efficiency measures); Tierney, supra note 33, at D1 (arguing that the benefits of
energy efficiency measures have been overstated).
35. STEVE SORRELL, UK ENERGY RESEARCH CTR., THE REBOUND EFFECT: AN ASSESSMENT
OF THE EVIDENCE FOR ECONOMY-WIDE ENERGY SAVINGS FROM IMPROVED ENERGY EFFICIENCY
vii-viii (2007), available at http://www.ukerc.ac.uk/DownloadsPDF/07/O71OReboundEffect/
071OReboundEffectReport.pdf; see also GLOBAL VIEW SUSTAINABILITY SERVS. ET AL., supra note
32, at 9 (detailing measurement methodology for rebound effects).
36. See Stephen Pacala & Robert Socolow, Stabilization Wedges: Solving the Climate
Problem for the Next 50 Years with Current Technologies, 305 SCIENCE 968 (2004); see also
GLOBAL VIEW SUSTAINABILITY SERVS. ET AL., supra note 32, at 16-17 (advocating a "mixed
instrument" approach in which technology-based efficiency measures are coupled with energy-
pricing changes, provision of better information to consumers, environmental taxes, and other
measures).
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from Congress to the Department of Energy ("DOE").37 The standards
set forth by statute are typically based on negotiated consensus
agreements between product manufacturers and environmental
advocates. 38 In other words, Congress has been willing, on a
bipartisan basis, to enact detailed performance standards for products
because the standards codified agreements already reached by the
manufacturers themselves. Congress has then delegated the detailed
rulemaking and implementation to DOE, and has also charged DOE
with updating standards over time. 39
Until recently, the rulemaking process at DOE was sluggish. 40
In the 1990s and 2000s, DOE fell significantly behind its statutorily
mandated rulemaking schedules, 41 and by 2005, DOE had still not
37. The following federal statutes contain energy efficiency standards for products: Energy
Policy and Conservation Act (EPCA), Pub. L. No. 94-163, 89 Stat. 871, amended by National
Energy Conservation Policy Act, Pub. L. No. 95-619, 92 Stat. 3206 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.); National Appliance Energy Conservation Act (NAECA) of 1987,
42 U.S.C. §§ 6291-6309 (2006), amended by National Appliance Energy Conservation
Amendments of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-357, 102 Stat. 671, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6291-6309 (2006); Energy
Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-486, 106 Stat. 2776 (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 16, 25, 26, 30, and 32 U.S.C.); Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, 119 Stat. 594
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 16, 22, 26, and 42 U.S.C.); Energy Independence
and Security Act of 2007, Pub L. No. 110-140, 121 Stat. 1492 (codified in scattered sections of 2,
15, 42, and 46 U.S.C.). DOE's current appliance efficiency regulations are contained at 10 C.F.R.
§ 430 et seq. (2012) (standards for consumer products) and 10 C.F.R. § 431 et seq. (2012)
(standards for commercial and industrial equipment).
38. See LOWENBERGER ET AL., supra note 22, at 63 (detailing the history of energy
efficiency standards in the United States).
39. See, e.g., NAECA § 325(b)-(h) (requiring DOE to amend standards within three to ten
years, depending on the product).
40. See Steven Nadel, Appliance and Equipment Efficiency Standards, 27 ANN. REV.
ENERGY & ENV'T 159, 182 (2002) (noting that the DOE rulemaking process can be "contentious
and long" and that rulemakings designed to last three years have often taken ten years). The
rulemaking process calls for analyzing the technical and economic issues associated with setting
an energy efficiency standard for a product category, proceeding through notice and comment
rulemaking, and then issuing the final rule. Experts at the Lawrence Berkeley National
Laboratory and other contractors advise DOE on the technical and economic aspects of each rule.
See U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-42, ENERGY EFFICIENCY: LONG-STANDING
PROBLEMS WITH DOE's PROGRAM FOR SETTING EFFICIENCY STANDARDS CONTINUE TO RESULT IN
FORGONE ENERGY SAVINGS 2 (2007), available at http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-42. The
rules are also reviewed by the White House Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs. About
OIRA, WHITEHOUSE.GOV, http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg-administrator (last visited
Sept. 2, 2012).
41. See U.S. GOv~T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 40, at 5 (noting that DOE had
missed all thirty-four of the rulemaking deadlines that had been established for twenty different
consumer product and industrial equipment categories).
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completed rulemakings that Congress had mandated in two statutes
from the late 1980s.4 2
Under the Obama Administration, however, the program has
expanded considerably, and DOE has promulgated product standards
at an unprecedented rate. Between January 2009 and March 2012,
DOE completed new or updated MEPS for seventeen product classes-
such as water heaters, refrigerators, and fluorescent lighting-and
eleven more standards are expected to be issued by January 2013. 43
By volume of rulemaking, this is easily the biggest
environmental regulatory effort in the entire Obama Administration.
Indeed, expanding direct government regulation of energy efficiency is
one of President Obama's principal environmental legacies. In
addition to issuing a torrent of new efficiency standards for appliances
and electronics that had been stalled in the Bush Administration, the
Obama Administration also substantially increased automobile fuel
efficiency standards44 and promoted energy efficiency standards for
buildings in the American Recovery Act.45 DOE has promulgated more
MEPS since January 2009 than it issued in all prior years since the
founding of the agency in 1978.46
The U.S. regulatory approach aims for incremental
improvements in energy efficiency by setting standards that reflect
(but do not exceed) the most efficient existing products on the market.
As a result, regulation has had the intended effects of saving energy
42. Under the Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1992, DOE was obligated to set
energy efficiency standards for categories of consumer products and industrial equipment
including: clothes washers; refrigerators, refrigerator-freezers, and freezers; small furnaces;
central air conditioners and heat pumps; clothes dryers; dishwashers; fluorescent lamp ballasts;
room air conditioners; water heaters; direct heating equipment; furnaces; general service
fluorescent lamps and incandescent lamps; kitchen ranges and ovens; mobile home furnaces; pool
heaters; electric motors; and distribution transformers. Id. at 1-8. By 2009, the only consumer
products for which rulemaking had been completed were refrigerators, refrigerator-freezers,
freezers, small furnaces, and clothes washers. Id. at 5. In that year, the agency was sued over its
lassitude, resulting in a consent decree imposing tighter deadlines. Consent Decree at 9-11,
State v. Bodman, No. 05 Civ. 7807 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 6, 2006).
43. LOWENBERGER ET AL., supra note 22, at iv.
44. See Nick Bunkley, New Gas Economy Rules Generate Wide Support, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
17, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/18/business/energy-environment/new-fuel-economy-
rules-win-broad-support.html (discussing the Obama Administration's proposed standards that
would require automakers to increase the average, unadjusted fuel-economy of their vehicles to
54.5 miles per gallon).
45. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, H.R. 1, 111th Cong. § 410 (2009)
(providing incentives to states to enact building energy efficiency codes).
46. LOWENBERGER ET AL., supra note 22, at 5, 16.
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and knocking the worst-performing products off the market, but the
regulations themselves have rarely been technology forcing. 47
There are three main reasons why the United States does not
rely on technology-forcing regulation. here. First, as noted above,
MEPS set by Congress have been based on consensus negotiations
involving multiple industry players who would oppose mandates that
they could not meet with available technology. 48 Second, by statute,
DOE must establish MEPS at a level that achieves "the maximum
improvement in energy efficiency" that DOE determines is
"technologically feasible and economically justified."49 Finally, very
stringent efficiency standards, if promulgated by DOE, would be
difficult to justify under cost-benefit tests applied in the Obama
Administration. This is because the Administration established a
relatively low dollar figure ($21 per ton) for the benefits of avoiding
C02 emissions, 50 and that figure, although heavily criticized, has been
used in the regulatory reviews for efficiency standards since 2010.
Despite the incremental, consensus-oriented nature of the
program, the U.S. regulatory approach to energy efficiency has yielded
substantial energy savings and environmental benefits. The ACEEE
has estimated that if efficiency standards enacted before 2008 had
never been enacted, U.S. electricity use would have been 7% higher in
47. Technology-forcing regulation refers to regulation that commands results beyond the
capabilities of existing technology, See John Copeland Nagle, Pornography As Pollution, 70 MD.
L. REV. 939, 970 (2011) ("Technology-forcing laws require pollution reductions that cannot be
achieved with existing technologies, thereby requiring technological innovation."); Cass R.
Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Default Principles, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1651, 1679 (2001) (defining a
technology-forcing regulation as one that "require[s] companies to innovate, and thus to do more
than what current technology permits").
48. See U.S. Govr ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 41, at 2.
49. 42 U.S.C. § 6295(o)(2)(A) (2006). An economically justified standard is one where the
benefits exceed costs, taking into account seven factors such as the economic impact on
manufacturers and consumers, operating cost savings over time, any lessening of the
performance of the products, and impacts on competitiveness. Id. § 6295(o)(2)(B)(I)-(VII).
50. The $21 per ton figure was developed by an interagency working group in 2010.
INTERAGENCY WORKING GRP. ON SOC. COSTS OF CARBON, SOCIAL COST OF CARBON FOR
REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS - UNDER EXECUTIVE ORDER 12866, at 3 (2010). The economic
models on which this figure is based have been heavily criticized, however. See Elizabeth A.
Stanton, The Social Cost of Carbon, ENVTL. F., Nov./Dec. 2011, at 38, 39 (noting that the
economic models used to calculate the social cost of carbon are highly sensitive to assumptions
about climate sensitivity and the relationship between temperature increases and economic
damages). Numerous studies have estimated the social cost of carbon at many times that figure.
See id. at 39-41 (noting that using a lower discount rate greatly increases the social cost of C02
emissions and discussing studies with estimates as high as $1,550 per ton in the year 2050); see
also RUTH GREENSPAN BELL & DIANNE CALLAN, ENVTL. LAW INST., MORE THAN MEETS THE EYE:
THE SOCIAL COST OF CARBON IN U.S. CLIMATE POLICY, IN PLAIN ENGLISH 3-4 (2011) (discussing
studies that estimate the social cost of C02 emissions at $41-$124 per ton).
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2010.51 Additionally, the ACEEE has estimated that pre-2008
standards (not including the major standards enacted under the
Obama Administration) will cut U.S. C02 emissions by 6.5% by 2020
and 7.5% by 2030, compared to a business-as-usual baseline.52
According to the ACEEE, net savings to consumers and businesses
from the standards already adopted will total $1.1 trillion by 2035. 53
Other studies have come to similar conclusions about the
environmental benefits and cost effectiveness of these regulations. 54
2. Efficiency Regulation in the European Union
The MEPS program in the EU differs in two principal respects
from the program in the United States. First, EU legislation is more
comprehensive than its U.S. counterpart, as it provides authority to
set standards for any product class that uses an external energy
source-potentially thousands of different product classes. 55 Second, in
the EU, product standards are a core plank of a much larger EU-wide
strategy to improve energy efficiency by 20% and reduce greenhouse
gas emissions to 20% below 1990 levels by 2020.56 The United States
51. MAx NEUBAUER ET AL., AM. COUNCIL FOR AN ENERGY-EFFICIENT ECON., KA-BOOM!:
THE POWER OF APPLIANCE STANDARDS iii (2009), available at http://www.aceee.org/sites
/default/files/publications/researchreports/a091.pdf.
52. Id. at 11.
53. LOWENBERGER ET AL., supra note 22, at i. The average benefit-cost ratio for the twenty-
six evaluated standards is 4:1. That is, the product lifetime savings are, on average, four times
larger than the upfront incremental costs for efficiency improvements. Id. at 8.
54. For example, a 2003 study concluded that the efficiency standards that took effect in
the United States from 1988-2003 will capture cumulative reductions in energy use from 1988-
2050 of 8%-9% relative to a no-standards baseline. The corresponding cumulative cost of these
standards was estimated at $200-$250 million (2002 dollars), with a cumulative (through 2050)
benefit/cost ratio of 2.75:1. ELIZABETH DORIS, JAQUELIN COCHRAN & MARTIN VORUM, NAT'L
RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB., ENERGY EFFICIENCY POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES: OVERVIEW OF
TRENDS AT DIFFERENT LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT 13 (2009), available at http://www.nrel.gov
/docs/fy10osti/46532.pdf. Another study estimated 4% and 8% energy use reductions resulting
from standards in the commercial and residential sectors, respectively, for standards in place
from 1987-2006. Id.
55. The Eco-Design Directive applies to a sweeping range of products. Products subject to
the Directive include "any good that has an impact on energy consumption during use which is
placed on the market and/or put into service, and includes parts intended to be incorporated into
energy-related products .... " Directive 2009/125/EC of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 21 October 2009 Establishing a Framework for the Setting of Ecodesign Requirements
for Energy-Related Products, 2009 O.J. (L 285) 10, 15. The Directive applies only to products sold
in volumes greater than 200,000 units per year. See id. at 20.
56. The strategy is laid out in a comprehensive 2006 "Action Plan" for Energy Efficiency.
Action Plan for Energy Efficiency: Realising the Potential, COM (2006) 545 final (Oct. 19, 2006),
available at http://ec.europa.eu/energy/action-plan-energy-efficiency/doc/com-2006-0545-en.pdf.
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has no comparable national targets, nor an equivalent national
strategy to reduce energy consumption or emissions.51 On a per capita
basis, energy consumption in the United States is twice as high as in
Europe.58
The legal basis for EU product efficiency regulation is the 2005
Eco-Design Directive, a framework directive that provides authority to
the European Commission to set MEPS for a wide variety of product
classes (excluding automobiles, which are covered by other
legislation).59 Under this Directive, the Commission is empowered to
set performance standards not only for products that use energy, such
as motors, lighting, and refrigerators, but also for other products that
affect energy consumption, such as insulation, windows, and
showerheads. The Commission estimates that MEPS promulgated
under the Eco-Design Directive could reduce European electricity
consumption by more than 12% from 2009 levels by 2020 6 0-a
remarkable energy savings from a single piece of legislation.
The Eco-Design Directive symbolizes a major reorientation of
European environmental policy. The EU is shifting from addressing
solely the environmental impacts of manufacturing processes toward
addressing, more holistically, the life-cycle environmental impacts of
products themselves. 61 This shift is exemplified by the Integrated
57. President Obama committed at the Copenhagen Climate Summit to reduce U.S.
greenhouse gas emissions by 17% below 2005 levels (or approximately to 1990 levels) by 2020.
Lisa Friedman, U.S. Bound by Obama's Copenhagen Emissions Pledge-U.N. Official, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 20, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/gwire/2010/01/20/2Ogreenwire-us-bound-by-
obamas-copenhagen-emissions -pledge-i 7687.html. However, this Executive Branch commitment
was not supported by Congress and has not been codified by statute.
58. See Noah M. Sachs, Greening Demand: Energy Consumption and U.S. Climate Policy,
19 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POLy F. 295, 300 (2009) (comparing per capita energy consumption of the
United States with that of several European countries). U.S. energy intensity (energy consumed
per dollar of GDP) is about one-third higher in the United States compared to other developed
countries. See REAL PROSPECTS REPORT, supra note 1, at 26-27. While differences in industry
composition and climate account for some of this disparity, about fifty percent of the observed
differences in the energy intensity of developed economies result from differences in energy
efficiency. Id.
59. The Eco-Design Directive provides authority to regulate the energy use of products as
well as toxicity, manufacturing impacts, disposal impacts, and other negative environmental
consequences from products. Eco-Design Directive, supra note 55, at art. 15. The emphasis of the
Commission to date has been on energy consumption, however.
60. EUROPEAN COMM'N, EcODESIGN YOUR FUTURE 4, available at http://ec.europa.
eulenterprise/policies/sustainable-business/ecodesignlfileslbrochure ecodesign-en.pdf.
61. See Integrated Product Policy: Building on Environmental Life-Cycle Thinking, at 4-5,
COM (2003) 302 final (June 18, 2003), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eulLexUriServ
/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2003:0302:FIN:en:PDF (discussing EU strategy for reducing
environmental footprint of products).
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Product Policy ("IPP"), of which the Eco-Design Directive is one
component. The IPP was adopted in 2003 to establish "a new growth
paradigm and a higher quality of life through wealth creation and
competitiveness on the basis of greener products."62
While the Eco-Design Directive lays out a broad framework for
addressing the climate impacts of products, the actual targets and
timetables for achieving efficiency improvements are contained in
"implementing measures" that the European Commission began to
enact in 2008.63 As of June 2012, the Commission has passed
implementing measures for thirteen different product categories. 64 For
each product category, the energy performance standard is set
through a process of negotiation with key stakeholders 65 and through
consideration of technical, economic, and environmental factors.66
As an example of how this process works, consider the
implementing measure for televisions and monitors. The Commission
found that televisions and monitors in the EU consumed fifty-four
terawatt-hours ("TWh") of electricity in 2005, and it projected that
electricity consumption for televisions and monitors would reach 132
TWh by 2020 (an amount equal to the entire projected electricity
consumption of Sweden in that year).67 Concluding that there were
available, low-cost technologies that could improve efficiency, the
Commission ultimately set the minimum energy performance
standard at a level that called for 20% to 30% less energy usage than
the 2009 average for those products.68 It projects that the new
standard will avoid thirty-four million tons of C02 emissions over ten
years.6 9
62. Green Paper on Integrated Product Policy, at 3, COM (2001) 68 final (Feb. 7, 2001),
available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/com/200 1/com2001_0068en0 1.pdf.
63. Bernhard Kuschnik, The European Union's Energy Using Products-EuP-Directive
2005/32 EC: Taking Transnational Eco-Product Design Regulation One Step Further, 27 TEMP.
J. ScI. TECH. & ENVTL. L. 1, 5-6 (2008).
64. The full set of regulations, including the energy performance standards issued for each




67. Commission Staff Working Document, Accompanying Document to the Commission
Regulation Implementing Directive 2005/32/EC with Regard to Ecodesign Requirements for
Televisions: Full Impact Assessment, at 4, SEC (2009) 1011 final (July 22, 2009), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/energy/efficiency/ecodesign/doc/legislation/sec_2009_101 1.pdf.
68. Id. at 6-7.
69. Id.
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The EU has set efficiency targets that are more ambitious than
the current averages for each product class. But they do not
necessarily reflect the highest level of efficiency achievable, or the best
performer in a product class. Still, as in the United States, the targets
have the effect of phasing out the least efficient products on the
market.
The scope for future rulemaking is wider in Europe than in the
United States. Because the Eco-Design Directive empowers the
Commission to enact implementing regulations for most energy-using
devices on the market, the Commission has wide-ranging authority to
expand the use of MEPS in Europe. In contrast, in the United States,
Congress must specifically authorize MEPS for each new product
category (with some residual authority for DOE to amend standards
on its own).70
This difference in authority provides important flexibility for
the EU to set standards for the next wave of electronic products, those
not yet covered by efficiency standards. Today's homes are a hive of
electronic devices-with dozens of items plugged in at any one time,
including cable boxes, video game consoles, electronic picture frames,
home networking equipment, and multiple cell phone chargers. 71
According to a study by the Natural Resources Defense Council, a U.S.
family with a digital video recorder and a cable set-top box uses more
energy to power those devices than to power its refrigerator. 72 The
study also estimated that cable set-top boxes in the United States use
as much electricity annually as all households in Maryland.73 Given
these trends, policymakers need to look beyond traditional appliances
in pursuing an energy efficiency strategy, and one challenge of a
regulatory approach is the need to update standards frequently to
respond to market conditions, consumer preferences, and technological
changes. The EU, with broad authority over energy-using products, is
well positioned to respond to these changes.
70. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C.A. § 6295(m) (West 2012).
71. The average California home, for example, now contains more than forty products that
are continuously drawing power greater than 110 watts. REAL PROSPECTS REPORT, supra note 1,
at 86.
72. NATURAL RES. DEF. COUNCIL, BETTER VIEWING, LOWER ENERGY BILLS, AND LESS
POLLUTION: IMPROVING THE EFFICIENCY OF TELEVISION SET-TOP BOXES 2 (2011), available at
http://www.nrdc.org/energy/files/settopboxes.pdf.
73. Id. at 1.
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II. COMPARING PRODUCT REGULATION TO ALTERNATIVE CLIMATE
POLICIES
As the United States, the EU, and other jurisdictions adopt
product standards to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, there are two
important questions that need to be addressed. First, could the
efficiency of energy-using products be promoted even more effectively
through other, nonregulatory tools, such as product labeling or carbon
pricing aimed at raising the price of energy? And second, if a
regulatory approach to product standards is to be expanded, how
should MEPS be structured to avoid some traditional drawbacks of
command-and-control regulation, such as policy rigidity or adverse
impacts on private-sector innovation? In this Part, I compare MEPS to
alternative instruments for promoting energy efficiency and respond
to some potential criticisms of a regulatory approach.
A. Energy Market Failures and Barriers
Government intervention to address escalating energy
consumption is justifiable because energy markets are prone to
market failure, resulting in persistent suboptimal investment in
climate-friendly technology. The most significant market failure is
that the environmental consequences of energy consumption,
including global climate change and conventional air pollution, are
unpriced. Energy consumers-from individuals to multinational
firms-are externalizing the costs associated with climate and public
health damage. Since they are not paying the social cost of every unit
of energy they consume, they have suboptimal incentives to conserve.
Economists have identified additional failures in energy
markets as well. These have been exhaustively documented
elsewhere, 74 and I provide just a brief overview here. One notable
market failure is that the interests of those who purchase energy-
using appliances (such as landlords) often diverge from the interests of
those who pay the energy costs (such as tenants). Under these split-
74. See, e.g., REAL PROSPECTS REPORT, supra note 1, at 96-104 (discussing market failures
and barriers to energy efficiency); Adam B. Jaffe, Richard G. Newell & Robert N. Stavins,
Economics of Energy Efficiency, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ENERGY 79, 83-85 (Cutler J. Cleveland
ed., 2004) (distinguishing between market failures that immediately impact the adoption of
energy-saving technology and those that do not); Jaffe et al., supra note 28, at 166-68 (analyzing
the interaction between market failures associated with environmental externalities and market
failures associated with technological innovation); Sachs, supra note 58, at 305-11 (discussing
principal-agent divergence, information and search costs, high discount rates, and utility
incentives).
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incentive conditions, energy is consumed by end users who have little
control over the efficiency of the products they use. Conversely, energy
is also consumed by people (such as hotel guests and office workers)
who are shielded, to some extent, from the costs of their
consumption. 75 Workers who routinely leave their computers on at
work are reacting to the zero-price signal that prevails for energy use
at the office.
Additionally, energy markets are plagued by information gaps
and information asymmetry. There is a lack of comparative efficiency
information for many products, 76 and consumers often have little
understanding of both their own energy usage and the current price of
electricity, natural gas, or other fuels. 77
In addition to these well-known market failures, several
market barriers also create suboptimal energy efficiency investment.
While not true market failures, 78 these barriers tend to limit consumer
adoption of energy efficient technologies. For example, capital
constraints may preclude consumers and firms from making cost-
effective upfront investments in efficiency. Companies may simply
overlook potential bottom-line savings from energy efficiency
improvements, as many corporate managers do not consider energy
efficiency to be a core activity of their firms, 79 and there are few career
rewards or bonuses for finding the savings. Purchasers of energy-
using products have high discount rates for future energy savings,80 so
75. See Sachs, supra note 58, at 307-08 (discussing principal-agent divergence).
76. See id. at 298, 308-09, 314-16, for a discussion of limited consumer information on
energy pricing and energy efficiency. See also REAL PROSPECTS REPORT, supra note 1, at 32
("[S]ubstantial investments in time and effort may be required to find and study information
about the potential energy-saving technologies, measures, and actions."); David Popp, Richard G.
Newell & Adam B. Jaffe, Energy, the Environment, and Technological Change 31-33 (NatI
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 14832, 2009), available at http://www.nber.org/
papers/w14832.pdf (examining market failures caused by imperfect information).
77. See MCKINSEY & Co., REDUCING U.S. GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS: How MUCH AT
WHAT COST? 37 (2007) (examining abatement options for greenhouse gases, including providing
better information to consumers about energy use); Sachs, supra note 58, at 308-09 (discussing
high costs of consumers obtaining information on electricity pricing and usage).
78. REAL PROSPECTS REPORT, supra note 1, at 96-104 (discussing differences between true
market failures, such as unpriced externalities, and market barriers, such as limited access to
capital for upfront investments).
79. See Michael Vandenbergh et al., Implementing the Behavioral Wedge: Designing and
Adopting Effective Carbon Emissions Reduction Programs, 40 ENVTL. L. REP. 10547, 10554
(2010) (citing a survey in which managers of one firm required a payback on energy efficiency
investments of over 30% per year, a rate significantly higher than that of other available
investments).
80. See MCKINSEY & CO., supra note 77, at 40-41 (noting that consumers expect many
household efficiency investments to pay off through savings over two to three years, resulting in
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they often opt for cheaper, less efficient models even if more efficient
models would pay for themselves within a few years. U.S. tax policy
also undermines long-term investments in efficiency, despite some tax
credits and other preferential treatment for energy efficient
appliances and equipment.8' Most importantly, the tax code allows
firms to immediately deduct expenses for electricity and fuel
purchases, but capital investments in energy-saving equipment must
be depreciated over very long time periods (thirty-nine years, in the
case of commercial buildings).82
These features of energy markets result in a paradox: the
marketplace may not adopt energy efficient technology or practices
even where firms and consumers could save money by doing so.8 3
These market failures and barriers on the demand side are
compounded by the fact that the supply of energy efficient equipment
is suboptimally low because firms' research into energy efficiency is a
public good. As Nobel Prize winning economist Kenneth Arrow
recognized as early as 1962, entrepreneurs will not succeed in
capturing full returns on research investments because the resulting
knowledge is nonrival and not all knowledge is patentable. 84 Because
research is a positive externality, the market, left to itself, will
produce too little private-sector investment in energy efficient
technology.8 5
Some form of government intervention is justifiable to correct
market failures and overcome these hurdles to energy efficiency. The
question is: Which policy tools are best suited for the task? Potentially,
governments could deploy a variety of tools other than MEPS, such as
product labeling, electricity taxes, a broad carbon tax, or carbon
pricing grounded in emissions trading. At first glance, these strategies
have several advantages over MEPS.
an implicit discount rate of nearly 40%); Sachs, supra note 58, at 309 ("[C]onsumers have a very
low sensitivity to the prospect of a reduction in energy bills even a year or two in the future.").
81. See 26 U.S.C. § 45M (2006) (tax credit for efficient home appliances); § 25D (tax
incentives for energy efficient residential properties).
82. Id. § 168(c).
83. See Michael Vandenbergh et al., Individual Carbon Emissions: The Low-Hanging
Fruit, 55 UCLA L. REV. 1701, 1734 (2008) ("Consumers' extremely high discount rates for long-
term savings from one-time purchases tend to serve as a barrier . . . to economically favorable
investments in energy-saving devices.").
84. See generally Kenneth Arrow, The Economic Implications of Learning by Doing, 29
REV. EcoN. STUD. 155 (1962).
85. See Popp et al., supra note 76, at 3 ("Because of the public goods nature of knowledge, a
firm that invests in or implements a new technology typically creates benefits for others while
incurring all the costs."); see also Jaffe et al., supra note 28, at 168-70.
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First, by disclosing information on product energy consumption
or raising the overall price of energy consumption, these demand-side
tools could achieve gains in energy efficiency without requiring
government officials to engage in product-by-product rulemakings.8 6
They devolve decisionmaking from government agencies to consumers
themselves.
Second, energy-pricing strategies could provide incentives for
consumers to reduce reliance on energy-using products already in
homes and businesses. Product standards, on the other hand, apply
only to new products as they are introduced into the market. Relying
on a regulatory strategy for promoting energy efficiency inevitably
means that there will be several years of capital stock turnover before
a newly enacted product standard becomes the prevailing standard for
the majority of goods in use.8 7
Finally, MEPS may reduce energy consumption by limiting
consumer choice. For example, some consumers may desire a low-cost,
inefficient product because of budget constraints that limit upfront
expenditures. Consider a low-income family that wants to buy a room
air conditioner for use only fifteen to twenty days per year. The family
may very well prefer a cheaper, less efficient brand of air conditioner,
but MEPS-in setting a minimum floor for efficiency-may force the
86. See HERMAN VOLLEBERGH, ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV., IMPACTS OF
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY INSTRUMENTS ON TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE 7 (2007) ("[D]irect
regulations may constrain the potential 'space' for innovation, reducing incentives to identify
those options that are most cost-effective in the long run.").
87. See Sachs, supra note 58, at 314 (noting that the benefits of performance standards
take many years to realize because they apply only to new products). These same issues
regarding capital stock turnover arise in the policy choice between increasing Corporate Average
Fuel Economy ("CAFE") standards for automobiles and raising gasoline taxes. A gasoline tax
affects operating costs for all automobiles in use, whereas CAFE standards affect only new cars
being sold into the market. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, FUEL ECONOMY STANDARDS VERSUS A
GASOLINE TAX 2 (2004) ("A gasoline tax is a good policy to compare with CAFE standards because
it is the most direct way to reduce gasoline consumption. By raising the price of gasoline to
consumers, a tax raises the cost of driving and encourages consumers to buy more-fuel-efficient
vehicles."); see also Freeman, supra note 4, at 366-68 (analyzing the Obama administration's
rulemaking to raise fuel economy standards in the wake of Congress's failure to enact more
comprehensive cap-and-trade legislation). Despite the theoretical advantages of a taxation
approach to improving efficiency, the United States continues to opt for the regulatory approach,
in large part because Congress has been unwilling to raise the federal gas tax, which has
remained constant at 18.4 cents per gallon since 1993. Moreover, the public strongly prefers a
regulatory approach to a taxation approach. See CHRIS BORICK & BARRY RABE, BROOKINGS INST.,
PUBLIC VIEWS OF CLIMATE POLICY OPTIONS 2-5 (2012) (discussing polling data showing that only
6% of Americans strongly support increases in gasoline taxes, whereas 44% strongly support the
increase in CAFE standards to 54.5 mpg).
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cheapest products off the market.88 Or consider a hypothetical
regulation that bans "always on" or "standby mode" capabilities in
consumer electronics. This would result in massive energy savings
(the United States runs at least eight large power plants just to power
equipment that is ostensibly off), 89 but the ban would come at a cost of
functionality. Consumers will not want to go back to the days of
getting up from the sofa to turn on the television manually.
Of course, MEPS can and should be deployed in tandem with
other policies, such as energy-consumption labeling or a cap-and-trade
system, to capture the benefits of multiple approaches and raise
revenue at the same time (this is the EU policy structure). But MEPS
should not be discarded. They have some major advantages that help
to explain their persistence in environmental policy throughout the
developed world.
In outlining these advantages, it is helpful to compare MEPS to
a labeling-only strategy, in which the energy consumption of products
would simply be disclosed on a product label. This option has been
advocated by Kip Viscusi and other scholars, who have argued that
information disclosure is a preferable solution for any market failure
or consumer irrationality in energy markets. 90 After discussing the
disclosure alternative, I will compare MEPS to energy-pricing systems
for encouraging efficiency, such as energy taxes or a cap-and-trade
system.
B. Standards Versus a Labeling-Only Strategy for Efficiency
One advantage of regulation compared to a labeling-only
strategy is that MEPS apply behind the scenes to a limited class of
88. See Kenneth Gillingham, Richard G. Newell & Karen Palmer, Energy Efficiency
Economics and Policy 23 (Res. for the Future, Discussion Paper 09-13, 2009) ("[Plroduct
standards could lead to a loss in economic efficiency by forcing behavior change on those who
gain relatively little from energy efficiency (e.g., those who do not use the product often) .... ").
89. See ROCKY MOUNTAIN INST., REINVENTING FIRE 83 (2011); see also Pulling the Plug on
Standby Power, ECONOMIST, Mar. 9, 2006, http://www.economist.com/node/5571582 (noting that
standby electronics may account for as much as 13% of residential energy consumption). In many
cases, products consume more power while switched off, due to the fact that many electronics are
switched on for only a few hours a day. REAL PROSPECTS REPORT, supra note 1, at 86. The issue
of standby power and always-on capability will become even more pressing as homeowners
install home networks in which products must remain on to remain connected to the network. Id.
90. Ted Gayer & W. Kip Viscusi, Overriding Consumer Preferences with Energy
Regulations 11 (Mercatus Ctr., No. 12-21, 2012), available at http://mercatus.org/publication/
overriding-consumer-preferences-energy-regulations ("Even if such behavioral biases are leading
to inefficient energy decisions by consumers, providing accurate information to consumers would
be preferable to regulatory mandates.").
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manufacturers, rather than to hundreds of millions of consumers. As
such, MEPS do not depend on consumers having a detailed
understanding of energy pricing and energy usage. A labeling-only
strategy, in contrast, depends entirely on consumers' ability to trade
off capital equipment costs and long-term operational costs. But the
lack of consumer understanding of energy pricing (particularly
electricity pricing) is a serious hurdle to reliance on product labeling
as the primary tool to promote efficiency. Electricity prices, unlike
gasoline prices, vary by the hour, and consumers are usually unaware
of these swings in prices. The argument that labels alone will help
consumers determine the optimal trade-off between purchase price
and long-term operational costs ignores this reality of the market.
Product standards, in contrast, avoid many of these informational
problems that plague markets for efficient equipment, 91 and they
prevent the worst-performing products from reaching the market at
all.
A labeling strategy also shifts substantial search costs to
consumers and necessitates that the consumer act as the key
decisionmaker in this segment of national climate policy. Information
disclosure is an important complement to regulation in energy
efficiency policy. 92 But, standing alone, labeling initiatives can simply
be a cheap means for government officials to abdicate their
responsibility to protect public health and the environment. As Doug
Kysar has explained, product-labeling strategies can unjustifiably put
the consumer in a "heroic" role in which governments avoid making
hard choices and instead place the burden on consumers to
comprehend complex risks or to shift a market toward
environmentally friendly technologies. 93 But if consumers are not
tracking the labels, do not understand the labels, or become
overwhelmed by the search costs involved, government will have
abdicated responsibility with no other actor to take up the slack.
91. See Richard B. Howarth & Alan H. Sanstad, Discount Rates and Energy Efficiency, 13
CONTEMP. ECON. POLY 101, 108 (1995) ("[D]irect regulation of equipment performance might
side-step problems of asymmetric information, transaction costs, and bounded rationality,
obviating the need for individual consumers to make unguided choices between alternative
technologies.").
92. See, e.g., ELLIS, supra note 3, at 20 (MEPS and product labeling laws are
"complimentary" because "the former removes the worst performing products, while the latter
promotes the better ones").
93. See Douglas A. Kysar, Preferences for Processes: The Process/Product Distinction and
the Regulation of Consumer Choice, 118 HARV. L. REV. 525, 635 (2004) (criticizing development of
environmental policy based on revealed consumer preferences, because such policy transforms
the consumer's role into an "unwitting mechanism for collective valuation").
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Product efficiency regulation, on the other hand, represents a
governmental judgment on feasible improvements in energy efficiency,
bars the least efficient products from the market, and avoids "the need
for every individual to undertake the information and assessment
process inherent in trading off capital and energy operating costs."94
A second advantage of MEPS compared to a labeling strategy is
that consumers tend to have very high "hurdle rates" in their
purchases of major equipment;95 they demand rates of return on
efficiency investments that are much higher than prevailing market
interest rates in an economy. Therefore, even if a product label could
somehow disclose, based on prevailing energy prices, that higher
prices for efficient equipment could be recouped within one or two
years, many consumers would still opt for a product with a lower
upfront cost. MEPS help to overcome this important barrier to the
diffusion of energy efficient equipment.
Finally, energy-consumption labels are not likely to be effective
in situations where the purchaser of the product is not the ultimate
user, as in the landlord-tenant situation. MEPS have sometimes been
criticized for saddling low-income consumers with higher upfront
costs, 96 but for millions of tenants paying utility bills, the standards
help to ensure lower operating costs for products that were not of the
tenant's own choosing. 97
C. Standards Versus an Energy-Pricing Strategy for Efficiency
In comparing product regulation to a carbon tax or cap-and-
trade system, I focus specifically on the effects of these alternative
policies on energy consumption from energy-using equipment. I do not
presume that MEPS could have the same far-reaching economic and
environmental effects as these alternative policies. While studies by
the ACEEE and other organizations have concluded that product
94. Jaffe et al., supra note 28, at 172.
95. See Adam B. Jaffe & Robert N. Stavins, The Energy Efficiency Gap: What Does It
Mean?, 22 ENERGY POL'Y 804, 806-07 (1994) (discussing the high rates of return consumers
expect on investments in energy efficient technology).
96. See Ronald J. Sutherland, The High Costs of Federal Energy Efficiency Standards for
Residential Appliances, POL'Y ANALYSIS (Cato Inst., Washington, D.C.), Dec. 23, 2003, at 11
("Appliance standards impose an economic burden that weighs particularly heavily on low- and
middle-income people."); see also Michael P. Vandenbergh & Brooke A. Ackerly, Climate Change:
The Equity Problem, 26 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 55, 56 (2008) (noting potential higher costs resulting
from appliance efficiency standards).
97. See Sachs, supra note 58, at 307 (32% of American households are rentals, and tenants
pay utility bills in over 80% of these units).
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efficiency regulations can reduce U.S. energy consumption by 3% to
7% from projected business-as-usual conditions, a serious climate
change mitigation strategy requires a 50% to 85% reduction in global
greenhouse gas emissions by midcentury. Clearly, efficiency
regulations are only one piece of the mitigation puzzle. I have argued
in favor of carbon pricing elsewhere, 98 and there is no doubt that a
robust strategy to "green" energy demand needs to be economy-wide,
rather than focused on particular products.
The real question, therefore, is whether pricing strategies,
assuming they were implemented, would obviate the need for product
efficiency regulation. Could higher energy prices alone drive
technological change toward highly efficient products? As with product
standards and labeling, there are strong arguments for implementing
a tandem approach that would retain the policy architecture of
product standards, even under a carbon pricing system.
One advantage of product standards is that they have a global
reach. Because all manufacturers must comply with the standard to
sell in a major market such as the United States or the EU, the
standards can have the effect of upgrading the efficiency of
internationally traded goods. Furthermore, when a large jurisdiction
enacts product standards for energy efficiency, it makes it easier for
other jurisdictions to enact tough efficiency standards-the so-called
"California effect."99 In contrast, national carbon pricing does little to
reduce energy consumption outside the borders of the enacting
jurisdiction.
The most significant advantage of product efficiency standards
is that they guarantee improvements in energy efficiency and force the
worst-performing products off the market. The energy savings from
MEPS are predictable, relatively easy to quantify, and can be verified
after the fact.
In contrast, a carbon pricing approach may have only negligible
effects on greenhouse gas emissions associated with energy-using
products. Scholars have begun to question the widely held assumption
that carbon pricing alone can promote climate-friendly technological
and behavioral change. 100 To promote that change, a carbon price
98. Id. at 306 ("Putting a price on carbon emissions, through a carbon tax or cap-and-trade
system, is the single most important policy change that would move the United States away from
wasteful energy consumption habits.").
99. See DAVID VOGEL, TRADING UP: CONSUMER AND ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION IN A
GLOBAL ECONOMY 248-70 (1997) (discussing the "California effect" for globally traded goods).
100. See David M. Driesen, Free Lunch or Cheap Fix? The Emissions Trading Idea and the
Climate Change Convention, 26 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 1, 42-43 (1998) (questioning the
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(paid, for example, by gas distributors or electric utilities) would have
to be high enough to raise retail prices for natural gas or electricity, to
influence the behavior of consumers and firms, and to drive the
purchasing decisions of millions of consumers and firms toward energy
efficient products. But household energy demand is price inelastic-at
least in the near term'0 1-and with the notable exception of
automobiles, energy costs are a minor factor in most consumers'
purchasing decisions. Moreover, most carbon pricing policies proposed
to date would have only negligible impacts on the operating costs of
most household and commercial equipment. Any pricing strategy
would run headlong into the market failures and market barriers
discussed above that make energy prices an unreliable driver of
technological change in energy-using products.10 2
Above, I discussed the problem of consumers' lack of awareness
about the energy usage of particular products. Here, I contend that
even if consumers had perfect information about their monthly energy
usage, the energy usage of particular products, and projected energy
prices under a cap-and-trade or carbon tax regime, consumers would
still not care enough about small policy-driven changes in energy
prices to change their purchasing or usage habits. 0 3
Advocates of carbon pricing as a way to promote technological
innovation rarely address the cognitive issue of how small price
increases for electricity or natural gas will enter consumers'
awareness and affect the products they buy or the amount of energy
they use. 0 4 With a new abundance of natural gas in the United
commonly held view that cap-and-trade systems promote technological innovation); Klaus
Rennings, Redefining Innovation - Eco-innovation Research and the Contribution from
Ecological Economics, 32 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 319, 325 (2000) (noting that the innovation impacts
of tax-based energy-pricing strategies "may be watered down in the political process"); Michael P.
Vandenbergh, Amanda R. Carrico & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Regulation in the Behavioral Era,
95 MINN. L. REV. 715, 765 (2011) (criticizing policies aimed at reducing household energy
consumption for "reflect[ing] strong assumptions about the influence of price and thus often
overlook[ing] other influences on behavior").
101. See Bengt Kristr6m, Residential Energy Demand, in HOUSEHOLD BEHAVIOUR AND THE
ENVIRONMENT: REVIEWING THE EVIDENCE 95, 102 (2008) ("[R]esidential energy consumption in
the short term is one of the most inelastic goods in the economy.").
102. See Vandenbergh et al., supra note 83, at 1755 ("[N]umerous empirical studies
demonstrate that in practice, limited information, high transaction costs, and a wide range of
behavioral phenomena limit the extent to which price alone affects behavior.").
103. See Vandenbergh & Steinemann, supra note 15, at 1725 (discussing the irrationality of
consumers in their energy-consuming behaviors); see also id. at 1698 (noting barriers to
behavioral change even where the benefits of the change clearly outweigh the costs).
104. See Paul C. Stern, Blind Spots in Policy Analysis: What Economics Doesn't Say About
Energy Use, 5 J. POL'Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 200, 203 (1986) (criticizing economic models of energy
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States, electricity and natural gas prices are expected to remain low
for the foreseeable future.10 5 Moreover, in practice, the signaling effect
of many cap-and-trade systems is diluted due to political pressure to
keep energy prices stable. For example, the Waxman-Markey cap-and-
trade bill, which passed the U.S. House of Representatives in 2009,
contained numerous provisions, including free distribution of
emissions allowances, to ensure that retail consumers would not see
any significant energy price increases from the legislation.10 6
In short, there is simply insufficient market "pull" for
efficiency, in the form of consumer demand, to encourage the rapid
technological transformations needed to address the climate crisis.
That pull is unlikely to be generated by economy-wide cap-and-trade
systems or by carbon taxes, unless the carbon price is substantial
(above $80 per ton). A regulatory approach, by contrast, has the
potential to "push" efficient technologies even if retail energy prices
are low and even if consumers are not cognizant of the long-term
operational costs of equipment.
I do not mean to imply that regulation is always necessary to
promote energy efficient products in the marketplace. Major energy
users in the industrial, transportation, and building sectors already
have enormous financial incentives to reduce energy consumption
even without any governmental efficiency "push." Google, for example,
has worked for years to reduce energy consumption in its server
farms,10 7 and large commercial tenants seeking office space often
prefer highly efficient buildings. But at the retail level, where
consumers ordinarily are not paying attention to the energy usage of
products they buy, product standards should be maintained and
expanded to drive efficiency improvements.
Time is running very short for nations to address the climate
crisis, and the transition toward low-carbon, highly energy efficient
policy that "make strong assumptions about price responses [of consumers] that probably distort
the cognitive processes that mediate those responses").
105. U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., SHORT TERM ENERGY OUTLOOK 1, 9 (2012) (noting that
natural gas inventories in May 2012 were 31% higher than the previous year and that natural
gas prices are at "historically low levels"). The EIA also projected a 2.8% drop in retail electricity
prices by 2013, due primarily to a decrease in natural gas costs for electricity generators. Id. at
10-11.
106. See American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. § 783
(2009) (as passed by the House June 26, 2009) (requiring that allowances be provided to
electricity distributors to keep retail electricity prices stable).
107. See Google's Green Computing: Efficiency at Scale, GOOGLE, http://static.
googleusercontent.com/external-content/untrusted-dlcp/www.google.com/en/us/green/pdfs/google
-green-computing.pdf (last visited Sept. 5, 2012).
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economies must begin this decade. When it comes to speed of
implementation, product standards have clear advantages over other
policy tools to promote efficiency, especially in the United States,
where national carbon taxes or a cap-and-trade system are off the
political agenda. The legislative and administrative infrastructure for
enacting product standards is already in place on both sides of the
Atlantic, and MEPS have a track record of success. Moreover, in
opinion polling, Americans actually prefer regulatory approaches over
market-based approaches to climate change. For example, Americans
favor national renewable portfolio standards and the Environmental
Protection Agency's greenhouse gas emissions regulations compared to
fossil fuel taxes or a cap-and-trade system. 108
Ideally, governments should deploy a mix of policy tools, each
targeting different parts of the problem of escalating energy demand.
California and New York, for example, have used a mix of energy
efficiency tools to keep per capita electricity consumption flat since
about 1970.109 The EU has also deployed multiple policy tools to
promote energy efficiency and climate change mitigation. The EU
relies on MEPS, product labels, gasoline taxes, and a cap-and-trade
system to achieve an EU-wide goal of reducing greenhouse gas
emissions to 20% below 1990 levels by 2020. But in the United States,
the prospects for a national carbon tax or a cap-and-trade system are
highly remote. This leaves efficiency regulation as one of the few
remaining, politically acceptable strategies to reduce energy demand
in the United States.110
D. Avoiding the Pitfalls of Regulation
As the United States and the EU expand their standards for
product efficiency, critics are charging that the standards go too far-
that they interfere with consumer choice and are overly stringent or
prescriptive."1 As the Competitive Enterprise Institute charged,
108. See BORICK & RABE, supra note 87, at 1-2.
109. See REAL PROSPECTS REPORT, supra note 1, at 279-89 (analyzing methods used by New
York and California to minimize per capita electricity consumption).
110. See Jaffe et al., supra note 28, at 169 (noting that in the absence of carbon pricing in
the United States, we are in a "second-best" setting in which "policy to foster greenhouse-gas-
reducing technology may be one of the main policy levers available and can be justified on
economic grounds so long as it has positive net benefits").
111. See, e.g., Sutherland, supra note 96, at 12 (noting that government regulation increases
price and forces choices upon consumers, especially the poor); Gayer & Viscusi, supra note 90, at
2 (Efficiency standards "assume consumers and, in some cases, firms are incapable of making
rational decisions and that regulatory policy should be governed by the myopic objective of
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efficiency standards put an "annoying regulation in every room in the
house."" 2 Product efficiency standards are prone to the informational
and bureaucratic pitfalls of any regulation, and the challenge for
policymakers is how to ensure smart regulatory design that does not
significantly disrupt product innovation or the consumer experience.
It would be easy to conceive of overly stringent or poorly
designed product standards that could damage whole industries.
Imagine, for example, that the United States had established an
efficiency standard for cell phones in 1999 requiring that cell phones
use 60% less energy by 2007. Such a standard would have
undoubtedly saved energy, but it would also have killed the market for
smart phones-with their larger screen sizes and larger energy
consumption-and would have hindered innovation in this fast-
moving industry." 3 Governments, therefore, need to be particularly
sensitive to the innovation effects of standards, avoid standards for
products with very short development cycles, work in close cooperation
with industry stakeholders, and revisit standards frequently.
In the view of many scholars, trying to craft product standards
that are compatible with innovation is a fool's errand because
centralized regulation of product performance is fundamentally
antithetical to technology innovation. 1 4 The traditional critique of
command-and-control environmental regulation, dating to the 1970s,
holds that prescriptive governmental regulation is ineffective because
(1) government is likely to do a poor job of promoting technological
change in a marketplace, (2) government is likely to make politically
motivated decisions benefiting favored firms, (3) command-and-control
regulation is homogeneous and rarely takes into account different
capabilities of firms to reduce emissions or innovate, (4) the private
sector is better positioned to gather and act on information regarding
energy efficiency to the exclusion of other product attributes."); Ben Lieberman, An Annoying
Regulation for Every Room in the House, BLOG OF COMPETITIVE ENTERPRISE INST. (Sept. 24,
2010), http://www.openmarket.org/2010/09/24/an-annoying.regulation-for-every-room-in-the-
house/ ("The only thing federal regulations accomplish is to force the government's preferred
choice on everyone.").
112. Lieberman, supra note 111.
113. See Megan Geuss, Why Your Smartphone Battery Sucks, PCWORLD (May 18, 2011),
http://www.pcworld.com/article/228189/why-your-smartphone-batterysucks.html (noting that
rapid development of smart phone technology and related increases in energy consumption are
outpacing battery development).
114. Richard B. Stewart, Regulation, Innovation, and Administrative Law: A Conceptual
Framework, 69 CALIF. L. REV. 1256, 1279-80 (1981) (outlining why regulation can disrupt or slow
innovation and arguing that the delay in firms' innovation associated with meeting regulatory
requirements reduces returns on investment and therefore contributes to a "comparative
advantage of existing products and processes").
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technological possibilities for pollution control, and (5) prescriptive
performance standards provide no reward for firms to innovate to
exceed the standard. 115
In the particular case of energy efficiency standards, critics
have charged that they impose unwarranted technical constraints on
product design, performance, or function and force firms to divert
R&D resources into regulatory compliance-a diversion that carries
significant opportunity costs. 116 Moreover, critics contend, federal
product standards cause regulatory uncertainty and potential delays
in moving innovative products to market. As Douglas Johnson, senior
director of technology policy at the Consumer Electronics Association
put it: "Mandates ignore the fundamental nature of the industry that
innovates due to consumer demand and technological developments,
not regulations."'117
Governments now have a thirty-year track record with MEPS,
however, and there is little evidence that MEPS have disrupted
innovation in regulated industries. From refrigerators to dishwashers
to televisions, energy-using products have become cheaper, more
efficient, and more feature-packed over time.118 Lighting efficiency
115. See Timothy F. Malloy, The Social Construction of Regulation: Lessons from the War
Against Command and Control, 58 BUFF. L. REV. 267, 283-88 (2010). Malloy helpfully groups
the standard critiques of command and control regulation into three categories: rigidity,
homogeneity, and competency. Id. For examples of the standard critique of command and control
regulation, see sources cited by Malloy, id. at 284-87 nn.49-61. See also Bruce A. Ackerman &
Richard B. Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1333, 1335 (1985)
("Uniform [technology] requirements waste many billions of dollars annually by ignoring
variations among plants and industries in the cost of reducing pollution and by ignoring
geographic variations in pollution effects."); Stewart, supra note 114, at 1282 (noting that
regulated industries are "likely to have a far greater working knowledge of the products or
processes sought to be transformed than the regulating agency," and accordingly, regulated
industries are in a strong position to challenge standards through litigation); Richard B. Stewart,
Economics, Environment, and the Limits of Legal Control, 9 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 6-9 (1985)
(contending that command and control regulation encourages wasteful practices, discourages
innovation, and largely fails at spurring new technology).
116. See Stewart, supra note 114, at 1280 (noting that command-and-control regulation
forces firms to divert resources into compliance and to divert management attention to
regulatory matters, which "may involve substantial opportunity costs"); see also Nicholas A.
Ashford, George R. Heaton & W. Curtiss Priest, Environmental Health and Safety Regulation
and Technological Innovation, in TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE FOR A DYNAMIC ECONOMY 161, 172-
78 (Christopher T. Hill & James M. Utterback eds., 1st ed. 1979) (outlining potentially disruptive
effects of regulation on firms' research and development efforts, management, and
competitiveness).
117. Jad Mouawad & Kate Galbraith, Plugged In Age Feeds a Hunger for Electricity, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 19, 2009, at Al.
118. See REAL PROSPECTS REPORT, supra note 1, at 50 (the average new refrigerator sold in
the United States in 2007 used about 498 kWh per year, 71% less than the average electricity
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standards enacted by Congress in 2007, discussed in more detail in
Part III, provide a recent example of how efficiency regulation can be
consistent with, and even promote, product innovation. When
Congress first enacted the standards, critics widely feared that they
would amount to a ban on incandescent light bulbs and a de facto
mandate for compact fluorescent bulbs.119 These fears proved to be
unfounded, however. By 2010, manufacturers had adapted to the
standards both by promoting compact fluorescent bulbs and by
developing a new generation of efficient incandescent bulbs that
complied with the standards. 120 In other words, the new standards led
to manufacturer innovation and more consumer choice in the market,
not less.
The debate over whether product efficiency standards promote
or hinder innovation is really a microcosm of a much larger debate
over whether environmental regulation can promote technological
innovation or whether it inevitably hinders it. There is now a wealth
of economics and business scholarship on this issue, with few
consistent results or conclusions. 12' One barrier to teasing out clear
cause-and-effect relationships is that "innovation" is notoriously
difficult to quantify. Those studies that attempt to quantify it (through
tracking patent applications in pollution control, for example) often
overlook that firms can make environmental improvements in
response to regulation through subtle operational changes or through
changing inputs, rather than through adding novel, patentable, end-
of-pipe technology. Therefore, studies that look only at patents in
examining responses to regulation may underestimate the true
amount of industrial innovation that is occurring.
Even defining a regulation is difficult, because a regulation is
more than its text. The impact of a regulation is also a function of the
comparative stringency of the regulation, firms' awareness of the
regulation, the expected likelihood of enforcement, and the potential
penalties for noncompliance.
Given the lack of clear conclusions from empirical studies,
regulatory critics continue to charge that government regulation will
used by a new refrigerator sold thirty years earlier, though refrigerators became larger and
offered more features in that time period).
119. See Leora Broydo Vestel, New Light in Old Bulbs, N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 2009, at Bi
(noting the widespread belief that incandescent bulbs would disappear because no traditional
incandescent bulbs could meet Congress's new efficiency standards).
120. Id.
121. For a survey of this literature, see generally Rene Kemp & Serena Pontoglio, The
Innovation Effects of Environmental Policy Instruments, 72 ECOLOGIcAL ECON. 28(2011).
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cap innovation and squelch industries, whereas advocates contend
that government standards actually incentivize industry to innovate
(the so-called "Porter hypothesis," after pioneering work in the early
1990s by Michael Porter).122 The truth is probably somewhere in
between, and much depends on the details of regulatory design.
Government regulation is best viewed as a shaper of ongoing
technological development, rather than as a trigger to start it or a
bludgeon to stop it.123 The innovation pathway of a firm is dependent
on so many factors, including R&D budgets, advances in basic science,
international competition, access to capital, and engineering skill.
Governmental standards are just one component of this larger
ecosystem.
In the debate over regulation and innovation, critics and
advocates of product standards are often talking past each other. They
are using the term "innovation" in two different senses. There is little
evidence that product standards hamper the overall pace of
technological innovation in an economy. On the other hand, it is quite
clear from empirical studies that product standards can promote
innovation in technology to save energy or reduce pollution (patents in
pollution-control equipment are one example). 124 In this more limited
sense, product standards can promote innovation in energy efficient
heating, cooling, lighting, and computing equipment on a global basis.
Moreover, product standards clearly assist in the important
goal of diffusion of energy efficient equipment throughout a market,
by prohibiting competition from low-cost, energy-hogging products.' 25
122. See Adam B. Jaffe, Richard G. Newell & Robert N. Stavins, The Induced Innovation
Hypothesis and Energy-Saving Technological Change, 113 Q.J. ECON. 941, 941-43 (1999)
(providing background on the induced innovation theory); Porter & Van Der Linde, supra note 29
(outlining the various ways that government regulation can promote technology innovation);
Vernon W. Ruttan, Induced Innovation, Evolutionary Theory and Path Dependence: Sources of
Technical Change, 107 ECON. J. 1520, 1520-22 (1997).
123. See Adam B. Jaffe, Richard G. Newell, & Robert N. Stavins, Environmental Policy and
Technological Change, 22 ENVTL. & RESOURCE ECON. 41, 61 ("[E]nvironmental policy
interventions themselves create new constraints and incentives that affect the process of
technological developments.").
124. For discussion of studies confirming that command-and-control regulation does
stimulate technological change, particularly as measured by filing of new patents, see
VOLLEBERGH, supra note 86, at 19-20.
125. Joseph Schumpeter maintained that new ideas permeate a market in three distinct
phases: invention (the idea of a new business or technological possibility), innovation (the
commercial introduction of the new idea), and diffusion (the gradual adoption by firms and
individuals of the innovation). JOSEPH SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY
132 (1942). Because product performance standards are typically based on the best-performing
products currently in use, they are most relevant to the diffusion stage of this process, rather
than to invention or innovation.
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Technology diffusion is critically important for climate policy, because
the ultimate test of whether any new product innovation makes a
difference in reducing energy demand is its degree of market
penetration. 126 Barriers to technology diffusion are particularly potent
for climate-friendly technologies, because, as discussed above,
consumers tend to choose products based on features and price, not on
marginal increases in energy efficiency. A regulatory push, in which
MEPS are set by law and noncompliant products can no longer be
sold, can help to overcome these barriers.
The challenge for policymakers, therefore, is how to implement
product standards in a way that is consistent with continued product
innovation. Sophisticated regulatory design can help to avoid some of
the traditional pitfalls of command-and-control regulation. 127 Most
importantly, regulations for energy efficiency should be based on
performance standards, without dictating that manufacturers adopt
specific technologies. A design standard, which mandates use of a
particular technology to achieve efficiency goals, essentially forecloses
any alternative technology-a brake on innovation. A performance
standard, on the other hand, can be satisfied through multiple
technologies and still allows firms to compete and innovate, both on
features and price.
Policymakers should also avoid product standards that are
technology forcing-that is, standards that require reductions in
energy use beyond anything manufacturers can currently achieve.
Environmental law scholars have often touted technology-forcing
regulation to drive innovation, on the grounds that tough mandates
can kick-start R&D. Scholars have pointed to several successful
examples of technology-forcing regulation in environmental law,
including regulation of industrial and automobile emissions. 128
Drawing on that track record, some scholars have suggested that the
climate crisis is so severe that government regulation should be
hyperstringent-forcing substantial technological improvement and
126. See EVERETT M. ROGERS, DIFFUSION OF INNOVATIONS 6 (2003) (defining diffusion as a
form of social change by which "alteration occurs in the structure and function of a social
system").
127. See Stewart, supra note 114, at 1284 (criticizing the view that there is inexorable
conflict between promoting social innovation such as environmental performance and promoting
firm profitability).
128. See, e.g., Thomas 0. McGarity, Radical Technology-Forcing in Environmental
Regulation, 27 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 943, 956-58 (1994) (suggesting that technology-forcing
regulation is, in many contexts, preferable to other regulatory tools in environmental law);
Stewart, supra note 113, at 1267 Oinking technology-forcing regulation to the further
development and adoption of technology).
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eliminating and/or replacing dominant firms that rely on "undesirable
technologies."129
Governments should tread carefully in the context of product
standards, however, given that the standards will be applied to fast-
moving industries and to billions of products in an economy. Product
regulation should not involve "shock treatment" for manufacturers, 130
and, as a matter of politics, it is unrealistic to think that federal or
state governments would ever deploy product standards to eliminate
dominant firms in an economy. Moreover, as a matter of regulatory
design, technology-forcing regulation for the environment involves the
difficult task of judging, ex ante, how far regulation can push
technology. As Adam Jaffe and his colleagues have concluded, "while
regulators can typically assume that some amount of improvement
over existing technology will always be feasible, it is impossible to
know how much." Therefore, technology-forcing product standards
"run the risk of being ultimately unachievable . .. ."1
The approach taken in the United States and the EU of close
consultation with industry to negotiate incremental improvements in
the existing energy performance of products is quite sensible. If
product standards were to become technology forcing, imposing
requirements that no actor in the industry can currently meet,
government runs the risk of blundering into costly and
anticompetitive standards. Moreover, the implementation of product
standards depends on manufacturer cooperation, and promoting
incremental improvement helps to ensure that cooperation over the
long term. Although it is tempting to wring massive energy savings
out of products by regulatory fiat, such stringent, better-than-best
regulation risks losing long-term political support for the programs.
Adverse effects on manufacturers can also be minimized by
allowing at least two years of compliance lead time and involving
multiple stakeholders in the planning process for standards.
Moreover, to provide incentives for manufacturers to exceed minimum
standards, governments should promote energy-labeling and
certification programs (such as Energy Star in the United States and
the flower eco-label in the European Union) for the best-performing
129. Nicholas A. Ashford & Ralph P. Hall, The Importance of Regulation-Induced Innovation
for Sustainable Development, 3 SUSTAINABILITY 270, 278 (2011).
130. Intl Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 648 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (discussing
technology-forcing automobile emissions regulations in the 1970 Clean Air Act).
131. Adam B. Jaffe, Richard G. Newell, & Robert N. Stavins, Technological Change & the




products on the market. In this way, regulatory standards force the
worst-performing products off the market, while the labeling and
certification programs help to promote the best-performing products
above the minimum efficiency threshold.
All climate change mitigation policies involve trade-offs. MEPS
do, in the end, reduce both manufacturer and consumer freedom in the
marketplace. That is the nature of this kind of regulatory
intervention. But MEPS can nonetheless be justified because of
market failures and because of externalities that turn individual
consumers' energy consumption into a collective escalation in energy
demand that speeds climate disruption. Ultimately, the desirability of
expanding a regulatory strategy to reduce greenhouse gas emissions
depends on one's views of the seriousness of the climate change
problem. If we simply ignore climate impacts from energy
consumption, then the case for government intervention to regulate
product performance becomes far weaker. But MEPS become essential
if we take scientists' recommendations seriously: that we need to use
every deployable policy tool to achieve 50% to 85% reductions in
greenhouse gas emissions by midcentury. 132 To make that transition
to a low-carbon economy, the United States and other nations need to
become vastly more efficient in the way they power their economies.
III. THE TASK AHEAD
Looking forward, the challenge of expanding product efficiency
standards is twofold. First, there is a technical challenge: getting the
standards right and deciding which product classes should be subject
to standards. Second, there is a political challenge: maintaining
support for product efficiency standards in the face of increasingly
strong opposition. Below, I consider both challenges for the future of
product efficiency standards.
A. The Future Technical Potential for Product Standards
The best recent analysis of the potential for future expansion of
MEPS in the United States has been performed by the ACEEE. In a
132. See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT:
CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: WORKING GROUP III: MITIGATION OF CLIMATE CHANGE 423-25 (2007)
(providing examples of MEPS and discussing their effectiveness in reducing greenhouse gas
emissions); NOBUO TANAKA, INT'L ENERGY AGENCY, WORLDWIDE IMPLEMENTATION Now: THE
ESSENTIAL ROLE OF ENERGY EFFICIENCY 2-5 (2008) (citing energy efficiency as a necessary and
effective means for combating climate change).
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March 2012 report, the ACEEE showed that feasible new standards
for thirty-four product categories could shave an additional 7% off U.S.
electricity consumption by 2035 compared to current projected trends
and would also save consumers almost $170 billion (in net present
value 2010 dollars) over the same time frame.133 Some of these savings
come from updating older standards (such as existing standards for
clothes washers), and some come from establishing new standards for
products that have become large components of energy use (such as
cable set-top boxes, motors, furnace fans and blowers, and commercial
refrigeration equipment).134 The following chart illustrates future
electricity savings from realistic expansion of MEPS in the United
States.
133. LOWENBERGER ETAL., supra note 22, at v-vii.
134. Id. at vii tbl.ES-2.
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The ACEEE study suggests that there is ample room for
expanding MEPS in the coming years. For example, it shows that
significant savings could be obtained from cable set-top boxes and
video game consoles (through a requirement that these devices default
to a low-power mode when not in use). 136 And it shows significant
savings from computer equipment, microwave ovens, and other
products (through promulgating MEPS equivalent to current Energy
Star-labeled products).137 DOE has already undertaken preliminary
analyses of standards for many of the products in the report, such as
commercial furnaces and commercial refrigeration. 138 Barring repeal
of the underlying statutes or curtailment of DOE's authority, at least
a dozen new U.S. MEPS are likely to be enacted this decade.
In Europe, the European Commission is currently conducting
preparatory studies for additional product standards under the Eco-
Design Directive, and the standards are expected to be finalized by
135. Id. at iii.
136. Id. at 29-31.
137. Id. at 27-31.
138. Energy Conservation Standards for Commercial Refrigeration Equipment: Public
Meeting and Availability of the Preliminary Technical Support Document, 76 Fed. Reg. 17,573
(Mar. 30, 2011).
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2015. Covered products include industrial furnaces, machine tools,
outdoor lighting, and central heating equipment. 139
As noted above, there are limits to what governments can
achieve by expanding MEPS in the coming decades. MEPS cannot
guarantee absolute reductions in energy consumption. MEPS can
promote more efficient refrigerators, but they cannot change
consumers' desires for ever-larger refrigerators, or their decisions to
run two refrigerators in a household. 140 And product standards, while
promoting equipment efficiency, do little to do promote systems
efficiency. For example, standards can lead to adoption of more
efficient light bulbs, but they do not provide incentives to design
buildings that rely on daylighting of offices rather than artificial light
bulbs. For these larger, systemic changes, other policies are necessary,
such as energy efficient building codes, carbon pricing, and smarter
land use regulation. 141
Global energy consumption is ultimately a function of
population growth, economic growth, new energy-using technologies,
diffusion of efficiency measures, and consumer preferences and habits.
It is asking far too much of incremental product standards to judge
MEPS a success only if they reduce absolute global energy
consumption. The function of MEPS is more limited: achieving
marginal reductions in energy demand as one of many strategies for
climate change mitigation.
B. The Political Viability of Product Standards
The other major challenge for product standards as climate
change policy is how to ensure political support. In the United States,
MEPS have enjoyed relatively strong political backing. The major U.S.
energy efficiency statutes were signed by President Ronald Reagan,
President George H.W. Bush, and President George W. Bush,142 and
139. ARNE REMMEN, RIKKE DOROTHEA ANDERSEN & CARL DALHAMMAR, EXPANDING THE
SCOPE OF THE EuP DIRECTIVE 38-39 (2011).
140. See U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, REFRIGERATOR MARKET PROFILE 1 (2009) (noting that 26%
of all U.S. households have two refrigerators).
141. For recent work discussing how to promote more systemic changes in land use,
architecture, information systems, and transportation to promote energy efficiency, see generally
NEAL ELLIOTT, MAGGIE MOLINA & DAN TROMBLEY, AM. COUNCIL FOR AN ENERGY-EFFICIENT
ECONOMY, A DEFINING FRAMEWORK FOR INTELLIGENT EFFICIENCY (2012), available at http:/
/www.aceee.org/sites/default/files/publications/researchreports/e125.pdf; LOVINS, supra note 1.
142. President Reagan signed the National Appliance Energy Conservation Act of 1987,
Pub. L. No. 100-12, 101 Stat. 103 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6291- 6309 (2006)) and the National
Appliance Energy Conservation Amendments of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-357, 102 Stat. 671.
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Congress enacted them on a bipartisan basis. For example, the
National Appliance Efficiency Conservation Act of 1987 passed the
Senate 89-6 and passed the House on a voice vote. 143 The Energy
Independence and Security Act of 2007, which contained light bulb
efficiency standards, passed the House 314-100 and the Senate 86-
8.144
Recently, however, U.S. efficiency standards have come under
attack. The efficiency standard for light bulbs has become symbol on
the right for an overreaching federal government-an intrusive
"nanny state." In 2011, the light bulb standard became front-page
news as numerous repeal bills were introduced in Congress and
Republican presidential candidates advocated repeal in their stump
speeches. This controversy over the light bulb standard may be a
harbinger of open conflict over a broader class of product efficiency
standards, which have previously been obscure energy policy
measures. Below, I explore the larger implications of the light bulb
debate.
Congress enacted the first efficiency standards for light bulbs
in the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 ("EISA"). 145 The
statute required DOE to issue Tier 1 standards mandating a 25% to
30% increase in light bulb efficiency, to be phased in for different
wattage bulbs between 2012 and 2014, and it required DOE to issue
Tier II standards to take effect in 2020, which would raise light bulb
efficiency at least 60%.146 Lighting is a major component of U.S.
energy consumption. Approximately one hundred large power plants
are needed in the United States just to power residential and office
President George H.W. Bush signed the Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-486, 106 Stat.
2776 (codified as amended in scattered sections of Titles 16, 25, 26, 30, and 32 of the U.S. Code),
and President George W. Bush signed the Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, 119
Stat. 594 (codified as amended in scattered sections of Titles 16, 22, 26, and 42 of the U.S. Code)
and the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, Pub L. No. 110-140, 121 Stat. 1492
(codified in scattered sections of Titles 2, 15, 42, and 46 of the U.S. Code).
143. Bill Summary & Status: 100th Congress (1987- 1988), S.83, Major Congressional
Actions, LIBR. CONGRESS, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?dlOO:SNO0083:@@@R (last
visited Aug. 28, 2012).
144. Bill Summary & Status: 110th Congress (2007 - 2008), H.R.6, Major Congressional
Actions, LIBR. CONGRESS, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d110:HROO0O6:@@@R (last
visited Aug. 28, 2012).
145. Pub. L. No. 110-140, 121 Stat. 1492 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 6292 (2008)).
146. JEFFREY LOGAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS22822, LIGHTING EFFICIENCY STANDARDS
IN THE ENERGY INDEPENDENCE AND SECURITY ACT OF 2007, at 2 (2008).
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lighting, 147  and incandescent bulbs are woefully inefficient in
converting electricity into visible light.' 48
In 2009, DOE issued the Tier 1 standard, requiring at least a
25% increase in the efficiency of various bulbs, beginning with the one
hundred-watt light bulb.1 49 This new standard would avoid C02
emissions equivalent to seventeen million cars. 150 In the media, the
Tier 1 standard was repeatedly mischaracterized as a design standard
that banned the 125-year-old incandescent light bulb,' 51 though the
standard was in fact a performance standard, not a design standard or
a ban. The DOE standard was widely supported by lighting
manufacturers, who had negotiated with the agency on its wording
and implementation. 52
After the DOE rulemaking, there was a swift reaction against
the potential disappearance of Thomas Edison's iconic light bulb. "Let
there be incandescent light and freedom. That's the American way,"
radio commentator Rush Limbaugh said on a broadcast.1 53 Republican
presidential candidate Michelle Bachman called for repeal of the
standard and promised to allow "you to buy any light bulb you
want."' 54 The Wall Street Journal editorial page described the light
bulb standard as a "nanny state" provision "passed at the height of the
147. Id.
148. The overall efficiency of incandescent bulbs is 1.3%. About two-thirds of the energy in
coal is lost in generating electricity, about 9% is lost in transmitting and distributing the
electricity, and an incandescent bulb's efficiency in transforming electricity to visible light is only
4%. In comparison, compact fluorescent lamps (CFLs) are about four times more efficient. A
complete switch in the United States from incandescent lighting to CFLs today would save
nearly 6% percent of the total electricity generated in the United States. REAL PROSPECTS
REPORT, supra note 1, at 30.
149. Energy Conservation Program: Energy Conservation Standards and Test Procedures
for General Service Fluorescent Lamps and Incandescent Reflector Lamps, 74 Fed. Reg. 34,080
(July 14, 2009) (codified at 10 C.F.R. § 430.32 (2012)).
150. See Robert B. Semple, Jr., Dim and Dimmer, N.Y. TIMES, July 10, 2011, at SR11.
151. See Editorial, The Light Bulb Police, WALL ST. J., June 7, 2011, at A16 ("[W]e will all be
required to buy compact fluorescent lights, or CFLs."); Led by Murdoch Outlets, Conservative
Media Misled Light Bulb Consumers 40 Times In 7 Months, CLIMATE PROGRESS (July 19, 2011,
9:43 AM), http://thinkprogress.org/romm/2011/07/19/272195/murdoch-conservative-media-
misled-light-bulb-consumers/ (detailing media mischaracterization of the light bulb efficiency
standard).
152. NEMA Reiterates That Light Bulb Efficiency Standards Remain, Consumers Retain
Diverse Options for Efficient Light Bulbs, NAT'L ELECTRICAL MANUFACTURERS ASS'N (Dec. 16,
2011, 12:00 AM), http://www.nema.org/News/Pages/NEMA-Reiterates-that-Light-Bulb-
Efficiency-Standards -Remain-Consumers-Retain-Diverse-Options-for -Efficient-Light -Bulbs.aspx.
153. Steven Mufson, Light Bulb Standards Won't Be Dimmed by Congress's Action, WASH.
POST, Dec. 17, 2011, at A10.
154. Andrew Restuccia, House Turns Out the Lights on Bulb Bill, HILL, July 13, 2011, at 1.
1672 [Vol. 65:6:1631
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global warming fad-scare when all proper thinkers were supposed to
sacrifice to the anticarbon gods."'155
Michigan Congressman Fred Upton symbolizes the shift in
views in the Republican Party about energy efficiency standards. 156
Upton was one of the authors of the original 2007 language in the
EISA creating the light bulb standard. In a 2007 press release, he
claimed:
This common sense, bipartisan approach partners with American industry to
save energy as well as help foster the creation of new domestic manufacturing
jobs. By upgrading to more efficient light bulbs, we will help preserve energy
resources and reduce harmful emissions, all the while saving American
families billions of dollars in their electric bills-and the benefits will be as
easy as a flip of the switch. 157
In 2011, however, upon assuming the chairmanship of the
House Energy and Commerce Committee, Upton made an abrupt
about-face and condemned the standard he had authored. The public,
Upton claimed, was sending "a clear signal that markets-not
governments--should be driving technological advancements.' 58
By 2011, at least five separate bills had been introduced to
repeal the light bulb standard. 159 On July 12, 2011, the full House
voted on repeal, but the bill fell fifty-seven votes short.' 60 Meanwhile,
155. The Light Bulb Police, supra note 151; see also Restuccia, supra note 154 (quoting Sen.
Jim DeMint: "It is just another government intrusion in our lives, and in the context of
ObamaCare, telling us what kind of health insurance we have to buy, I think people are just
increasingly aggravated that the government is telling us what kind of toilets we have, what
kind of light bulbs we have, what kind of health insurance, so I think it is just coming to a boil
outside.").
156. See Robin Bravender, Conservatives Burn Over Fred Upton's Light Bulb Law, POLITICO
(Nov. 14, 2010, 7:35 AM), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/1110/45059.html (describing
criticism from various conservative leaders of energy efficient ight bulb standards).
157. Rep. Upton Measure to Upgrade Energy Efficiency Standards for all Light Bulbs Now
Law, FED. NEWS SERV., Dec. 19, 2007.
158. Restuccia, supra note 154.
159. See Light Bulb Freedom of Choice Act, H.R. 5616, 110th Cong. (2008) (repealing the
2007 standards unless the Government Accountability Office finds that (1) consumers would
obtain a net financial savings by switching to the more efficient bulbs, (2) no health risks would
be introduced by the switch, and (3) total U.S. C02 emissions would decline by 20% by 2025 as a
result of the switch); Light Bulb Freedom of Choice Act, H.R. 849, 112th Cong. (2011) (same);
Better Use of Light Bulbs Act, H.R. 6144, 111th Cong. (2010) (repealing the light bulb
standards); Better Use of Light Bulbs Act, H.R. 91, 112th Cong. (2011) (same); Better Use of
Light Bulbs Act, S. 395, 112th Cong. (2011) (same).
160. The vote on July 12 was on the Better Use of Light Bulbs Act, introduced by Rep. Joe
Barton on July 6, 2011. That bill moved to a full floor vote without a hearing. The vote was 233-
193, and a 2/3 vote in favor was required because the vote was on a motion to suspend the rules
and pass the bill. Bill Summary & Status: 112th Congress (2011 - 2012), H.R. 2417, All
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as the repeal legislation was being debated in Congress,
manufacturers such as GE, Sylvania, and Phillips were publicly
stating that they had already shifted production toward more efficient
bulbs due to the Tier 1 standard.161 Not only could the manufacturers
comply with the new standard through compact fluorescent and LED
bulbs, but by 2010, they had also unveiled a new generation of
compliant, high-efficiency incandescent bulbs.162
The light bulb controversy came to a head in December 2011.
As part of a major omnibus spending bill needed to avert a
government shutdown, Republicans successfully introduced language
that prohibited DOE, for one year, from expending any funds to
enforce the new Tier 1 standard, but the spending bill did not repeal
the standard.1 63 According to many lighting manufacturers, the one-
year ban on enforcement funding had no effect on their phase out of
older incandescents, 64 and for the time being, the 2007 efficiency
standard remains the law.
The skirmish over light bulb efficiency standards offers several
lessons for the future of product standards. First, it highlights that
standards could become a partisan issue in the United States.
Although DOE can proceed with issuance of MEPS for a dozen or more
products under existing authority, future Congressional legislation
authorizing new MEPS may become controversial. A seesaw effect
may emerge in which MEPS are enacted and then threatened with
repeal, depending on party control over the different branches of
government. Other nations are moving ahead with a variety of energy
efficiency measures, so if the federal efficiency program stalls, the
already-wide gap between the United States and other countries in
per capita energy consumption could grow even larger.16 5
Congressional Actions, LIBR. CONGRESS, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d112:
HR02417:@@@X (last visited Aug. 29, 2012).
161. See LOGAN, supra note 146, at 3 (describing GE's and Phillips's plans for introducing
new light bulbs that meet the Tier 1 standards). According to GE, 94% of its lighting investment
was in energy efficient products in 2011, a 28% increase from 2010. Mufson, supra note 153.
162. See Vestel, supra note 119 (describing the wave of innovation after the light bulb
efficiency standards were enacted).
163. Consolidated Appropriation Act, 2012, H.R. 2055, 112th Cong. § 2(b) (2012); Andrew
Restuccia, Omnibus Spending Deal Blocks Funding for Light Bulb Efficiency Standards, HILL
(Dec. 15, 2011), http://thehill.com/blogs/e2-wire/e2-wire/l99851-spending-deal-blocks-light-bulb-
efficiency -standards.
164. See Mufson, supra note 153.
165. See Sachs, supra note 58, at 300 (comparing countries on per capita energy
consumption).
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Second, the light bulb controversy in the United States
indicates that the political framing of efficiency policy is shifting-
from a focus on energy and cost savings to a focus on personal freedom
and limiting intrusive government. Given widespread denial of
climate change on the right, it will be difficult for any Republican
politician to justify efficiency standards on environmental grounds.
Even if standards are justified purely as cost-saving measures, rather
than as climate change strategy, the cost-saving arguments may be
trumped in the future by concerns over intrusive government. 166
Will this political shift affect products other than light bulbs? It
may be too soon to tell, and the political dynamics will likely depend
on the product subject to regulation. Other efficiency standards, such
as those for refrigerators and air conditioners, have increased
efficiency without altering the fundamental characteristics of the
product. The light bulb standard, on the other hand, promoted
noticeable changes in the product, creating public backlash. Not only
did the standard apply to an iconic product, but millions of consumers
thought Compact Fluorescent Lamps ("CFLs") were simply not
equivalent in hue to the old standby. Therefore, it is unclear whether
the backlash on the right against mandatory product standards will
spill over into those MEPS that do not create a noticeable impact on
the consumer's experience.
What was really at stake in the light bulb controversy were
competing conceptions of consumer sovereignty.16 7 The background
assumption of opponents was that consumers are sovereign and
should be free to make whatever choice they want in the
marketplace-even wasteful choices that cost them more money. One
official from the Heritage Foundation, for example, pledged that
conservatives will continue to seek repeal of energy efficiency
mandates that "dictate choice."16s The background assumption of
166. See Katrina Fischer Kuh, When Government Intrudes: Regulating Individual Behaviors
That Harm the Environment, 61 DUKE L.J. 1111, 1175 (2012) ("[Governmental] controls on
environmentally significant individual behaviors... [are] ... particularly vulnerable to claims of
government intrusion ....").
167. Consumer sovereignty, a term originally coined by economist William Hutt, refers to
the "controlling power exercised by free individuals, in choosing between ends, over the
custodians of the communities' resources." W. H. Hutt, The Concept of Consumers' Sovereignty,
50 ECON. J. 66, 66 (1940); see also Kysar, supra note 93, at 584-87 (arguing that consumer
sovereignty encompasses consumer preferences for how products are made). See generally H.
Spencer Banzhaf, Consumer Sovereignty in the History of Environmental Economics, 43 HIST.
POL. ECON. 339 (2011) (outlining how competing visions of consumer sovereignty have shaped
cost-benefit analysis and environmental policy).
168. Restuccia, supra note 154.
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supporters, on the other hand, was that consumers' choices for items
as simple as a light bulb have wider implications for the national and
global environments. Externalities turn private choices into public
risks. While opponents of the standard focused on the freedom of each
consumer to choose, supporters were drawing back the lens to focus on
the environmental implications of billions of individual decisions to
buy inefficient light bulbs.
Looking forward, supporters of product standards as climate
policy should forthrightly acknowledge that every product regulation-
including energy efficiency standards, air bag requirements for cars,
and safety standards for baby cribs--dictates consumer choice to some
extent. The noncompliant products are not available as a consumer
choice in the marketplace. A limitation on consumer choice in the
marketplace is not per se suspect. The relevant question is whether
the limitation on consumer choice sufficiently promotes national
interests in public health, safety, and environmental protection.
Scholars are beginning to question the sacrosanct role of
consumer sovereignty as the primary driver of economic and
environmental policy. Consumer preferences have traditionally been
viewed as exogenous to market activity-the ex ante source of desire
that shapes how consumers act in the marketplace. The role for both
the market and for law was to ensure maximal satisfaction of these
preferences.169 But because the climate crisis is, in the end, a crisis of
unsustainable consumption, this traditional vision of consumer
sovereignty has now become highly problematic-an obstacle to
avoiding dangerous climate disruption. If climate change mitigation
policy is going to reach beyond large industrial sources of emissions,
policymakers will continually confront this traditional conception of
consumer sovereignty. Indeed, the fight over light bulb efficiency
standards could be just a preview of larger battles to come as nations
begin to address the climate consequences of individual and household
behavior.
Extensive social science and marketing research has
demonstrated that the traditional view of consumer sovereignty is
inaccurate. Consumer preferences for products are not exogenous to
market activity. Rather, consumer preferences are powerfully
constructed-by advertising and packaging, certainly-and also by
neighborhood and community norms and by law itself.170 For example,
the preference of many consumers for incandescent bulbs over CFLs or
169. Kysar & Vandenbergh, supra note 15, at 10829.
170. Id. at 10829-30.
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newer LED bulbs has been shaped by habit, history, and the fact that
existing law allows for the complete externalization of the
environmental costs of wasteful energy consumption. Though many
consumers prefer incandescent bulbs given this cultural and legal
backdrop, policymakers should not view that preference as a trump
card that prohibits enactment of cost-effective, climate-friendly
efficiency standards, or as a trump card that commands repeal of
existing standards. According to Michael Vandenbergh and Doug
Kysar, arguments that a policy is suspect if it interferes with
consumer preferences "miss the subtlety and complexity of
individuals' attempts to navigate the dense economy of signs and
meanings that is interlaced within the market, right alongside its
economy of goods and services." 171 Given the extensive research on
how consumer preferences are constructed both through culture and
through law, Vandenbergh and Kysar contend, "a great deal more
government intervention into consumer product markets on account of
environmental impacts of consumption could be justified as a matter
of theory."17 2
This critique of a slavish governmental obeisance to existing
consumer preferences may help, in the long run, to bolster the
theoretical groundwork for efficiency regulation. But in the near term,
as a practical matter to maintain political support for product
efficiency regulation, policymakers and energy efficiency advocates
still need to make the case for why energy efficiency standards benefit
consumers. This argument need not be phrased in terms of global
externalities, climate change, or consumer sovereignty. Rather, the
message to the public should be that saving fossil fuels is a better,
cheaper option than burning them.
CONCLUSION
Product standards have resulted in dramatic energy savings
and should continue to play an important role in climate change
mitigation strategy. While environmental law scholars have focused
on the major pollution-control statutes, product regulation has been
making a significant dent in global pollution-quietly and indirectly-
171. Id. at 10830; see also Vandenbergh & Steinemann, supra note 15, at 1705 (noting that
individuals are strongly influenced by what they perceive to be the behavior of others, and if
"carbon-reducing behaviors are perceived as widespread . . . more people are likely to adopt
them").
172. Kysar & Vandenbergh, supra note 15, at 10830.
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through shaping the eco-footprint of energy-consuming products in the
marketplace. Product standards are not a panacea for climate change,
and standing alone they will not reduce global energy demand. But
standards are an effective solution for one piece of the mitigation
puzzle: driving efficiency improvements in billions of consumer goods.
Designed correctly, with sensitivity to the capabilities of industry and
the preferences of consumers, MEPS can lead to cost-effective energy
efficiency gains-the lowest of the low-hanging fruit in climate policy.
